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Foreword
The contamination of Sudan by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) is the result of
more that two decades of armed conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the
Sudan People‟s Liberation Army. In 2005 the United Nations and national authorities
claimed that over a third of the country was contaminated, mainly in southern and central
parts of the country. Although it is now acknowledged that the total area of contamination is
much less, mines and ERW continue to hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid return and
settlement of refugees and Internally Displace Persons and hampers reconstruction and
development, particularly in central and southern parts of the country.
Mine action NGOs have been operating in Sudan for over ten years, initially in the South
under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan with the focus on mine risk education and
victim assistance. Some demining was conducted by the warring factions, but no proper
records were kept and the clearance was not conducted to international standards.
The National Mine Action Office based in Khartoum and the New Sudan Mine Action
Directorate based in Nairobi were established in early 2003 with support from United Nations
Mine Action Service to undertake emergency humanitarian clearance of mines and ERW.
However, coordinated mine action started in earnest following the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005 between the Government of
Sudan and the Sudan People‟s Liberation Movement/Army. On 24 March 2005 the UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 1590 to monitor the implementation of the CPA and to
establish a peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). One of the
responsibilities of UNMIS is the clearance of mines and ERW to enable the freedom of
movement of peacekeeping forces, and to facilitate the safe delivery of humanitarian aid.
As mandated by the CPA and the SCR 1590, in early 2005 the UN Mine Action Office
(UNMAO) was established to support the deployment of the UNMIS forces and coordinate
and undertake humanitarian the clearance of mines and ERW. The national mine action
authorities have evolved to National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), National Mine Action
Centre (NMAC) in the north and the Southern Sudan Demining Commission in the south,
established by presidential decrees of the Government of National Unity and government of
Southern Sudan, respectively.
Currently most of the key mine action activities in the Sudan are managed by the UNMAO.
However, the mandate of UNMAO expires in June 2011, by which time the national
authorities should have assumed all necessary regulatory and coordination responsibilities.
In order to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities to the national authorities, UNMAO is
developing a Transition Plan. Clearly, successful transition will depend on a carefully
designed and well resourced capacity development plan to reinforce and further develop the
national mine action capacities. This study by UNDP, as the lead UN agency for mine action
capacity development within UNMAO, is the first step in the design of such a Capacity
Development Plan.
UNDP has conducted this study with the support of Ralph Hassall of Cranfield University.
The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology has been used as it provides a systematic
and defensible method of assessing the capacity gaps and of prioritising capacity
development activities and initiatives. The study also includes a draft Capacity Development
Plan which covers the transition period and beyond. Much of the capacity development
post-June 2011 will be conducted by the national authorities themselves, however it is
envisaged that some ongoing international assistance will be required from UNDP and
others.
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UNDP and its national and international partners will work hard to ensure that the Capacity
Development Plan is implemented, and indeed is updated on a regular basis to reflect the
humanitarian, development and security goals identified in other national strategies such as
the UN Development Assistance Framework, the UNDP Country Programme Document and
other relevant strategies.
[INSERT ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE]
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 1: STUDY REQUIREMENT
1.1

Background

1.1.1 Sudan‟s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established on 24 December
2005 and official launched on 7 March 2006 with responsibility to direct and regulate mine
action in the Sudan. The NMAA, which is mandated by Presidential Decree1, comprises a
National Mine Action Committee, a General Secretariat, a National Mine Action Centre
(NMAC) based Khartoum, and the Southern Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre. In
addition, the Southern Sudan Demining Commission on 27 June 2006 2. The Committee,
which is an inter-ministerial body with representation from civil society, SAF, SPLA, and
GOSS and exercises its responsibilities through its Secretary-General, the Deputy Minister
of Humanitarian Affairs. The National Mine Action Committee meets from time to time, but
not a regular bases.
1.1.2 Many of the key regulatory and coordination responsibilities remain with the UNMAO,
including the accreditation of mine action implementing organisations, the development of
national mine action standards, and management of the Information Management System
for Mine Action 3. The two national mine action coordination centres, NMAC and SSDC,
have grown in size and capability but this has been in the absence of a comprehensive and
agreed capacity development plan.
1.1.3 The current mandate of UNMAO expires in June 2011, by which time the national
authorities should have assumed all necessary regulatory and coordination responsibilities.
In order to accelerate the transfer of responsibilities from UNMAO to the national authorities,
UNMAO is developing a Transition Plan. The aim of the Transition Plan is to guide the
efforts of the UN and national authorities to enable a smooth and systematic transfer of
responsibilities.
1.1.4 An essential part of the transition process is the further development and
strengthening of national capacities. But capacity development will not end when the
UNMAO mandate expires in three years time; indeed it is assumed that the national mine
action authorities will wish to continue to improve their abilities to effectively and efficiently
manage and deliver capabilities.

1.2

Aim and scope of the study

1.2.1 The aim of the UNDP study was to develop a comprehensive capacity development
plan which will enable the Sudan Mine Action Programme transition to full national
ownership.4
1.2.2 The study addressed solely the regulatory and management requirements of the
national authorities. The needs of the national mine action implementing organisations have
not been considered.

1.3

Key references and assumptions

1.3.1 The report is based on the responsibilities for managing mine action in Sudan as
defined in the CPA, UN Security Council Resolution 1590, Government of National Unity
(GONU) Presidential Decree 299, GOSS Presidential Decree 45 and other related
documents including the National Mine Action Strategic Framework Agreement adopted in
August 2006.
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1.3.2 The CPA established an interim arrangement in which a single state is ruled by the
GONU and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). This „one country
two systems‟ is central to understanding and analysing the effectiveness of the Sudan Mine
Action Programme.
1.3.3 Many challenges remain in Sudan. These include restrictions in the use of US
mapping software (which limits the application of IMSMA), restrictions on the deployment of
some international NGOs and commercial organisations, the lack of security (particularly in
Darfur), and restrictions on transferring funds into Sudanese banks which complicates the
direct funding of national organisations by international donors. The Capacity Development
Plan proposed in this report acknowledges these challenges.

1.4

Terms and definitions

1.4.1

For the purposes of this report:
a.

The Sudan Mine Action Programme refers to the NMAC, SSDC, UN and other
international and national bodies and accredited implementing organisations
involved in mine action in Sudan, and all current and planned mine action
projects and activities authorised by the NMAC, SSDC and UNMAO;

b.

Capacity development is an activity, or activities, which enable individuals,
groups, organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability to
manage and deliver capabilities in a sustainable manner - and to take
ownership of the problem and its solution. In mine action it involves inter alia
the introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the development of
systems of governance and coordination, and the ability of national authorities
to mobilise resources. 5

c.

Technical terms as defined in International Mine Action Standards (IMAS 04.10)
have been used.

1.4.2

A summary of the key terms and definitions used in the document is at Annex A.

1.5

Structure of report

1.5.1 Section 2 discusses the component parts of the Sudan Mine Action Programme, and
clarifies key terms used in the study including transition, national ownership, trusteeship,
governance and capacity development. This provides a firm foundation for the subsequent
analysis of NMAC and SSDC and the development of the draft capacity development plan.
1.5.2 Section 3 describes the approach used in the study and explains why the UNDP
Capacity Assessment Methodology6 was adopted. The approach provides a powerful way to
examine organisations such as NMAC and SSDC from different perspectives and against
different criteria.
1.5.3 Section 4 provides an analysis and assessment of NMAC, and Section 5 provides an
analysis and assessment of SSDC. This is achieved by:
a.

Determining the required future capacities of NMAC and SSDC in terms of
technical functions (such as managing clearance, mine risk education and
victim assistance), and of regulatory and management functions (such as
developing mine action policy and strategy, national mine action standards and
guidelines and systems for accreditation and quality management); and
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b.

Assessing the current capacities of NMAC and SSDC in terms of the ability to
(1) engage with stakeholders, (2) understand needs, (3) develop policy and
strategy, (4) develop, manage and implement projects and budgets, (5) monitor
and evaluate projects, and (6) specific governance including planning, tasking
and resource mobilisation.

1.5.4 Section 6 establishes a set of capacity development priorities based on the analyses
and assessments described in Sections 4 and 5. Three sets of priorities are proposed: one
set covering the „enabling environment‟ such as the development of national mine action
legislation; a second set covering ‟organisational performance‟ such as the transfer of
accreditation and quality management responsibilities from UNMAO to the national
authorities; and a third set covering the development of human resources.
1.5.5 Section 7 provides a draft Capacity Development Plan covering three periods: 2009
to 2011 (i.e. the period leading up to the end of the current CPA meeting its Mine Ban Treaty
obligations), and 2014 to 2017 (i.e. the final phase of the eight year Plan).

Notes on Section 1;
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

Presidential Decree No 299 of 24 December 2005.
Decree No 299 referred originally to a South Sudan Regional Mine Action Centre, which is now referred to
as the South Sudan Demining Commission (SSDC), and more recently by some as the South Sudan
Demining Authority (SSDA).
National mine action data is held in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)
database which is managed by UNMAO on behalf of the GONU.
Aim and scope of study; see Project Terms of Reference, UNOPS 30 May 2008.
The definition used here is an amalgam of (1) Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges, GICHD, Part II
Chapter 10, Ted Paterson, and (2) p.3, UNDP – Capacity Assessment Practice Note, 2007, UNDP.
Capacity Assessment Methodology, User‟s Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for Development
Policy, UNDP, May 2007.
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 2: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT IN SUDAN
2.1

Mine action in Sudan - the current situation

2.1.1 Since 2006, national authorities have been established to regulate mine action in
Sudan. At a policy level, an inter-ministerial body with representation from civil society and
the military, called the National Mine Action Committee is mandated to regulate the practice
of mine action in the country7. The Committee‟s executive authority has been de facto
accorded to its Secretary-General who is also the Deputy Minister of Humanitarian Affairs.
The offices concerned with the coordination and oversight of mine action are NMAC in the
north and SSDC in the south8.
2.1.2 In the northern areas, the NMAC has been embedded within existing government
departments and structures with a clear line of management, while in the southern region the
national authority has been developed from informal politico-military institutional
arrangements. There is a marked difference between the northern and southern approaches
in terms of bureaucratic, executive and government systems. There is also considerable
variability amongst national agencies in terms of capacity to manage and coordinate mine
action operations, evaluated against objectively verifiable criteria. Regardless of these
differences, the two poles of national agency operate under a single vision for mine action as
outlined in the CPA and expanded in a Mine Action Policy9 and a Common Strategic
Framework10 which is addressing the landmine/ERW contamination problems in the Sudan.
Establishment of all these organisations and the authorship of related mine action policy and
legislation represent significant achievements for national mine action in the Sudan.
2.1.3 Alongside the existence of these national agencies, UNMIS comprises the bulk of the
mine action effort in the country through its executing arm, UNMAO11. The programme is
well funded and the UN component is staffed by international and Sudanese national
personnel. UNMIS and UNMAO draw legitimacy from the CPA and UN Resolution 1590.
While the Security Council mandate directs that international mine action organisations
should „assist‟ the national authorities with coordination and technical advice12, in the
absence of well established national mine action authorities, UNMAO has assumed direct
control over responsibilities for the accreditation of demining organisations, and the conduct
of quality assurance and control of all UN-sanctioned operations according to National
Standards and Technical Guidelines (NSTG)13.
2.1.4 The control centre for UN operations is the UNMAO headquartered in Khartoum,
supported by three regional offices. To-date, UNMAO activities have been heavily centred
on mission requirements, such as the clearance of roads and access routes in support of
peacekeepers and opening of roads and routes to facilitate safe access. Within the UN
Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy14, UNDP leads on capacity development. Yet while there
is UNDP representation within UNMAO, it is not formally subordinated to UNMAS15. UNDP
alignment remains focused on the development of the capacity of national authorities to
regulate and manage mine action. This has sometimes not been aligned to the mission
requirements, or with the requirement for rapid service delivery.
2.1.5 The mine action component of the UN mission is overseen by a UN Mine Action
Steering Committee which was established in 2004 to provide policy and establish priorities.
However, this committee has not met since June 2006.
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2.2

Imperatives for change

2.2.1 The primary responsibility for mine action lies with the government of a mine-affected
state. This is normally exercised through a NMAA which is responsible for establishing the
national and local conditions to enable the effective management of mine action. In most
cases a National Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) or its equivalent will act as, or on
behalf of, the 'NMAA'. In certain situations and at certain times, it may be necessary and
appropriate for the UN, or some other recognised international body, to assume some or all
of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all of the functions, of a MACC. This is the case in
Sudan where, at the time the CPA was signed in early 2005, the UN was mandated to
assume many of the responsibilities of a Sudanese MACC.
2.2.2 Based on the provisions of the Presidential Decrees 299 and 45, since mid 2006 the
NMAC and SSDC have steadily been developing capabilities, and now have the minimum
required office space, transportation, and office equipment required of national MACCs.
Most senior and mid-level managers of both organisations have attended formal
management training, and the basis of an in-country coaching system has been established.
Yet the original arrangement of early 2005 remains, with UNMAO retaining most of the
regulatory responsibilities. There is an understandable desire for change by the national
mine action directors and their senior line managers.
2.2.3 The current UNMAO and UNMIS mandates will expire in July 2011, as will the
authority of the GONU. By then, the UNMAO must have handed over all remaining
responsibilities for regulation and coordination of mine action in Sudan; indeed it would be
prudent to transfer all the responsibilities well in advance of the deadline.
2.2.4 The Government of Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and
ratified it on 13 October 2003. The treaty entered into force for Sudan on 1 April 2004. This
requires Sudan to clear all known mines by 2014. This is a national responsibility and
requires national mine action leadership to ensure that the full clearance objective is
achieved. Furthermore, Sudanese national authorities need to establish the capability to
meet other treaty requirements including the preparation and submission of annual Article 7
transparency reports. It is worth mentioning that the Sudan has met its obligation under
Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty having destroyed all its known stockpiled antipersonnel
mines.
2.2.5 UNMAO is well funded as it forms part of the UNMIS, but funding for other mine
action projects in Sudan must compete with humanitarian and development projects
worldwide. There is a growing recognition that mine action will soon be affected by „donor
fatigue‟, and countries such as Sudan with considerable potential income from oil and other
exportable raw materials will be expected to fund its own mine action. It follows that the
national mine action authorities need to develop the systems, skills and knowledge to
mobilise resources and manage funds.
2.2.6 Deduction. There is a need and an expectation for the national authorities to assume
full national ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme. This will require UNMAO to
transfer some of its existing regulatory and coordination responsibilities prior to its mandate
ending, and for the NMAC and SSDC to develop the necessary systems, procedures and
skills to regulate and effectively manage all mine action within Sudan.

2.3

National ownership

2.3.1 The dominant narrative of capacity development and transition in Sudan is centred
on the concept of national ownership. As with all socially constructed concepts, the meaning
of the term is debated. This is certainly the case in Sudan, where multiple agencies,
including national executive bodies, with different values, cultures, missions and mandates
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seek to fulfil their objectives and in so-doing develop different perspectives of the concept of
national ownership.
2.3.2 The term ownership in a legal sense is used to describe the exclusive rights and
control over physical or intellectual property. It is embodied in a right of ownership, which is
often referred to as ‘title’. Ownership also implies some degree of interest in maintaining, or
indeed further developing, the value of the property.
2.3.3 The term national ownership in a strict legal sense can be used to describe the
ownership of property by the state, but it has slipped into the language of international
organisations, NGOs and civil society - in a wider sense - as exercising the right and
accepting the responsibility to address issues of national concern such as poverty, disease,
human rights and global warming.
2.3.4 In addressing such national issues and challenges, national ownership requires a
state to provide effective and appropriate governance (see below), and it needs the
engagement of civil society. But national ownership also requires the state to put in place a
number of „technical‟ capabilities and systems to enable the Government to exercise its
responsibilities. These include the development and use of national regulatory processes
including appropriate laws, the ability and willingness to plan and prioritise, the ability to
mobilise and manage resources, the management and effective use of information, and the
development of human capital and physical assets.
2.3.5 However, the term national ownership alone is insufficient to capture the
characteristics of accountability and legitimacy which is the essence of governance as
exercised by the UNMAO. For example, UNMAO cannot necessarily claim ownership on the
behalf of the Sudanese people, thus there is nothing „owned‟ which can be transferred. The
term ‘trusteeship’, which implies a sense of both assumed and sovereign legitimacy in the
delivery of certain services designed to bring about social outcomes can be used to bridge
this ideological gap16. In this study, the term trusteeship is used in preference to ownership
to describe those responsibilities which are currently vested in the UN and which will, in due
course, be transferred to national authorities in Sudan.

2.4

Governance

2.4.1 UNDP acknowledges that development agencies, international organisations and
academic institutions define governance in different ways.17 Some describe governance as
the system of values, policies and institutions by which a society manages its economic,
political and social affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil society and
private sector. Others describe governance in a more limited way as the action or manner of
conducting the policy and affairs of a state, organisation or people. For the purposes of this
study, the more limited definition of governance was used.
2.4.2 With regard to the regulation and management of mine action in Sudan, governance
can be considered as comprising two sets of capabilities: specific and general as described
below.
2.4.3 Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable
the national authorities to regulate and manage mine action. These include inter alia
organisational and operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and
prioritisation, the mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information
management using IMSMA, and the handover of safe, cleared land.
2.4.4 General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific
governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. This includes
the ability to recruit and select employees based on merit; the ability to ensure that technical
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decision making is not heavily influenced by politics; the ability to ensure that decisions are
made in a transparent manner; the ability to ensure that accountability is maintained within
individuals within organisations; and mechanisms to ensure a high level of public access to
decision-makers to ensure that policy reflects the needs of citizens. At a more technical
level, it requires the development of robust management procedures that will allow the
efficient and effective management of processes.
2.4.5 This distinction between general and specific governance is applied to the analysis
and assessment of the NMAC and SSDC in Sections 4 and 5.

2.5

Transition

2.5.1 The Oxford Dictionary defines transition as „..... the process of moving from one state
or condition to another.‟ This lends itself to the concept of transitioning the Sudan Mine
Action Programme to full national ownership, which involves taking the programme from a its
current state (where many of the regulatory and coordination responsibilities are being
exercised by UNMAO) to a state where these responsibilities are exercised by national
authorities, perhaps with some limited international assistance.
2.5.2 UNMAO has appointed a Transition Programme Officer to act as a focal point for this
work with the aim of developing a transition framework and plan by the end of 2008. A
workshop was held at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi from 25 - 28
February 2008 to address the transition of the Sudan Mine Action Programme to full national
ownership. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the issues which will impact on the
programme transitioning to national ownership. 18 Two more workshops were held in Nairobi
and in Khartoum, and a final workshop will be held in Juba on 18 November 2008.
2.5.3 The development of the transition framework and plan has required the UNMAO,
UNDP, NMAC and SSDC to examine closely the detailed capabilities which comprise a
national mine action capacity, to identify the responsibilities which need to be transferred
from the UNMAO to national authorities, and to consider the elements and components of
capacity development. The work has shown that the requirements of transition and capacity
development are complementary and mutually reinforcing, but are not identical.

2.6

Capacity development

2.6.1 Capacity development19 is a broad concept which enables individuals, groups,
organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability to manage and deliver
capabilities - and to take ownership of the problem and its solution. In mine action it involves
the introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the development of systems of
governance and coordination, and the ability of national authorities to mobilise resources
from national budgets. Moreover, it involves the development of national managers through
education, training and coaching.
2.6.2

The UNDP Capacity Development Process involves five steps:
a.

Step 1: engage with partners and build consensus.

b.

Step 2: assess capacity assets and needs.

c.

Step 3: prepare capacity development plan.

d.

Step 4: implement capacity development plan.

e.

Step 5: monitor and evaluate the development of capacities.

This study addressed the first three steps of the UNDP process.
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Notes on Section 2:
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Presidential Decree No (299), 2005.
See Government of South Sudan Presidential Decree 45/2006, In practice, few reporting lines exist
between the southern and northern entities.
The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, May 2006.
The Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework, June 2006.
For more detailed assessments that evaluate the performance of the Sudan Mine Action Programme from a
range of institutional standpoints see: Paterson and Bohle, 2008; Gomer et al, 2007; ICBL 2007; Bolton
2008.
See para 4 (c) Sudan Security Council Resolution 1590, 24 March 2005.
Based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
See Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Interagency Policy (6 June 2005) p.33
paras 97-113, specifically para 105.
This is also true of the MRE national coordinator position, which is supplied by UNICEF under a similar.
arrangement, although two international MRE officers are incorporated directly into the UNMAO structure.
These differences are not purely semantic; they have caused genuine disagreement over the process of
transition.
Governance Indicators - a Users Guide: www.undp.org/governance/docs/policy-guide-IndicatorsUser
Guide.pdf
Communique dated 28 February 2008.
Mine Action: Lessons and Challenges, GICHD, Part II Chapter 10, Ted Paterson.
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 3: ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
3.1

UNDP framework

3.1.1 Many capacity assessment methodologies, frameworks and tools are used by
development practitioners. The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology20 has been
adopted for this project. It provides a systematic and defensible method of assessing
capacity needs, establishing priorities and sequencing of capacity development projects and
activities. The approach can be used in complex development situations when it is not
always obvious where best to understand the relative needs and/or the order of
implementing capacity development projects and activities. Not least, it provides a common
language to facilitate discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity assessment. The
method thus represents an appropriate method of determining the capacity development
requirements of the Sudan Mine Action Programme.
3.1.2 The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology assumes there are two sets of issues
which need to be addressed. These are referred to as core issues relevant to the sector
being assessed, and cross-cutting technical and functional capacities.
3.1.3 Core issues include matters which are relevant to the context of the capacity
assessment. In the case of this study, such issues include the implications of Sudan‟s „onecountry-two systems‟, the need for mine action projects to be based on broader
humanitarian, national development and security priorities, and the particular needs of each
of the five pillars of mine action. Core issues also include specific matters identified by
stakeholders during the design phase of the assessment.
Cross-cutting technical & functional capacities
1

2

3

4

5

Core Issue 1

Core Issue 2

Core Issue 3

Core Issue 4

Core Issue 5

Figure 1: UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework

3.1.4 UNDP define cross-cutting technical and functional capacities as „... the capacities
necessary for the successful creation and management of policies, legislations, strategies
and programmes.‟ These include the ability of to be able to (1) engage with stakeholders,
(2) define realistic goals, objectives and outcomes, (3) develop policies and plans to enable
these goals, objectives and outcomes to be achieved, (4) mobilise resources and implement
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projects, and (5) monitor progress and evaluate results. At the project level, functional
capabilities represent the procedures, information and skills needed to execute the project
planning cycle.
3.1.5 The UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology recognises that capacities exist at
different levels: individual, organisation and the external environment which includes the
government, civil society and other key bodies with interest in the Sudan Mine Action
Programme. Capacity assessments should consider all three levels.
3.1.6 The three dimensions (core issues, technical and functional capacities, and levels of
analysis) are referred to as the UNDP Capacity Assessment Framework, and can be
represented as a cube consisting of a number of cells; see Figure 2. The UNDP
methodology envisages that an assessment team will analyse the effectiveness of current
capabilities by focussing on each cell, or groups of connected cells. In this study, for
example, SSDC initially were invited to express an opinion on the current effectiveness of
key individuals to develop policies and plans with regard to demining projects. These three
„dimensions‟ provided the focus for discussion on the need for capacity development.
Common technical & functional capacities

Issues which are relevant to the country,
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Figure 2: Modified capacity assessment framework

3.2

Study methodology

3.2.1 UNDP provides a „default‟ capacity assessment framework which must then be
modified to meet the particular needs of the country, sector and organisation being
assessed. The default framework is described at Annex C. The modifications used for this
study are described at Annex D. These modifications were made at the beginning of the
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study and approved by the UNDP Senior Technical Adviser prior to the start of meetings and
interviews with the Directors and staff of NMAC, SSDC and representatives of the
Government of Sudan.
3.2.2 The future capacity requirements of NMAC and SSDC were defined by referring to
the traditional roles and responsibilities of a national mine action authority and coordination
centre, modified to meet the particular circumstances existing in Sudan. The requirements
were assessed in terms of the five pillars of mine action, and ten core management
activities. The future core activities of NMAC and SSDC will be:
a.

Plan, coordinate, monitor and oversee all aspects of mine action in Sudan;

b.

Prioritise, task and authorise all mine action activities;

c.

Accredit mine action organisations in accordance with National Mine Action
Standards and Guidelines (responsive to IMAS) before any mine action activity
is authorised;

d.

Undertake quality management of all mine action activities;

e.

Revise National Mine Action Standards and Guidelines according to in-country
needs and conditions. Once revised, all concerned are obliged to adhere to
them;

f.

Maintain the integrity of IMSMA;

g.

Coordinate and oversee the implementation of MRE to communities at risk on a
priority basis;

h.

Mobilise the necessary funds from national and international sources to achieve
mine action strategic goals;

i.

Support the Government of Sudan to honour its obligations under the Ottawa
Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties; and

j.

Coordinate and oversee the implementation of VA to ensure physical and
psycho-social and economic rehabilitation and reintegration of the victims and
survivors of landmine and ERW accidents.

The future capacity requirements of NMAC are defined in Section 4, and the requirements of
SSDC are defined in Section 5.
3.2.3 An assessment of the current capacities was conducted using the assessment
framework described at Annex D. It is important to note that the preferred level of analysis
for the NMAC was the organisation, whereas the preferred level of analysis of the SSDC
was the individual. A series of meetings, interviews and roundtable discussions took place
in Khartoum and Juba between 26 July and 20 August 2008.

3.3

Presentation of findings

3.3.1 At the end of the assessment phase, a summary of the initial findings was presented
to the UNMAO, NMAC and SSDC. This was shown in the form of a chart which assessed
the level of current capacities against future requirements; see Annex D.
3.3.2 Discussion of the initial findings led to a deeper understanding of the capacity gaps,
and the need for potential enhancements. This analysis of the gaps and recommendations
for capacity development of NMAC is described in Section 4, and of SSDC in Section 5.
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Notes on Section 3:
20.

See: Capacity Assessment Methodology, User‟s Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for
Development Policy, UNDP, May 2007.
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 4: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION CENTRE
4.1

Overview and entry level

4.1.1 The NMAC is comprised of politico-military appointees, often on secondment from
military units or other governmental departments. As a result there are strong political and
military dimensions to work and organisational culture. Staff within the NMAC place
emphasis on organisational performance, and this was chosen for the entry point for
discussions of capacity. As the NMAC is already embedded within extant bureaucratic
framework, the organisational structure may be determined by existing policy and
regulations. So despite the organisational focus, the discussions regarding the structure of
the organisation are still ongoing and organisational development recommendations should
be mindful that organisational restructuring is “work in progress”.
4.1.2 In order to elicit the future end-state, two roundtable discussions were held between
the assessment team, the deputy director of the NMAC and the principal staff members,
including the heads of department. For evidence of capacity within the functional areas, the
roundtable discussions were supplemented by interviews with individual staff members, well
informed persons, and any other international staff that have knowledge of the abilities of
personnel within the NMAC. Documents outlining the current organisational structure, and
the Sudan Mine Action Policy were also used as references, as these are mostly normative
to mine action activities in the North.

4.2

Future performance: pillars of mine action

This part of the capacity assessment defines the future requirements of each mine action
pillar. It describes the setting within which NMAC will be required to regulate and manage
mine action in northern Sudan.
4.2.1

Clearance

If clearance rates continue as they are, the NMAC team envisage that within the next two to
three years the majority of high impact clearance in northern Sudan will have been achieved,
and the reduced nature of the humanitarian threat will determine the dimensions of the
demining programme in northern Sudan. In order to meet the residual threat, the clearance
programme will be primarily conducted by national organisations and the Joint Integrated
Demining Units (JIDU), although international organisations may well still be operating in the
country on commercial tasks in support of development, and humanitarian tasks. Logistical
and financial support for national demining operations will also be managed through the
NMAC, and unless machines are left behind after the departure of other international
organisations21 there will be no fixed assets such as machines. In addition to the clearance
work, survey, marking and other operations of organisations will be monitored; however
there will be no specific implementation capacity in these areas. Instead the NMAC will have
a purely regulatory, supervisory and coordinating role.
Aside from responding to specific clearance requests on a project-by-project basis, the
NMAC envisage that policy will be influenced by executive authority within the Ministry for
Humanitarian Affairs, the National Mine Action Committee, and other actors such as state
governors. The policy process may well be affected by an ongoing decentralisation of
authority to the state level. Even if the NMAC itself remains centralised and national the
decentralisation process may bring financial implications with it, and this could change
NMAC policy. Another influence on clearance policy will be the Ministry of Transport Roads
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and Bridges and JIDUs will continue to work on the clearance of strategic routes. There is
thus a clear developmental aspect to the clearance work.
4.2.2

Mine Risk Education

There will be no implementation capacity for MRE within the NMAC. Instead activities will be
focussed on coordinating, monitoring and training of trainers as well as tasking and
allocation of funds. While remaining mindful of the sustained requirements for basic mine
awareness, and classic educational announcements, the principal MRE role at the end state
is shifted towards community liaison and risk reduction. Therefore, technical MRE capacity
will exist to review and approve national MRE initiatives as well as to review and update the
national standards as required. The department is also able to monitor implementer activities
and evaluate social impact of interventions in terms of knowledge, attitudes and practice.
The training of trainer capacity allows MRE staff to brief and train implementers on good
practice and emerging techniques within this discipline.
At the local level, community networks and a surveillance system will be in place and these
are monitored by the NMAC. At the central government level, there are a number of key
partners from line ministries that have an important role to play in the delivery of MRE, these
are: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Information. These
ministries have representation on the National Mine Action Committee through which they
are able to influence mine action policy for MRE. The ministerial partners can also
mainstream MRE across existing services, such as incorporating awareness-raising
messages into educational curricula of schools in affected states. The NMAC envisages that
it will remain able to provide on-going technical support to these mainstreamed initiatives.
4.2.3

Stockpile Destruction

Future performance within the stockpile pillar will centre on two organisational competencies:
(1) the ability to liaise effectively with military units regarding caches of landmines that may
come to light, and their destruction; and (2) maintenance of a reporting system and
catalogue on the retained stockpiles of mines to ensure that the Government of Sudan
remains compliant with the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty (MBT). Thus, the role of the
NMAC for stockpile destruction is essentially a coordinating one, with coordination taking
place between civilian departments at the central and local levels, as well as military units,
potentially including those of non-state actors. The performance of the stockpile destruction
pillar is closely linked with that of advocacy and the two complement one another.
4.2.4

Advocacy

Within the NMAC, advocacy is viewed as an overarching capacity that encompasses other
pillars such as stockpile destruction, MRE and VA. This mine action pillar will thus have
shifted in mandate in that it will also include advocating for funds in addition to generalised
campaign for meeting Mine Ban Treaty obligations. This assumption is based on the
anticipated requirements of the programme, i.e. that as reporting on the implementation of
the MBT becomes a reduced technical activity the need for lobbying for external funding
support for humanitarian mine action will grow. This shift in requirement means that the role
of civil society organisations in the North such as the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines
will be diminished, whilst the fundraising responsibilities of the national authorities will
increase.
4.2.5

Victim Assistance

VA will continue to remain a high priority to NMAC and donors, who choose to fund national
organisations on a bilateral basis. There will also be a greater contribution by government to
VA activities as only the government can provide the scope of technical support and care to
victims and their dependents in a sustained manner. While much of the VA activity will have
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been mainstreamed into general disability programmes within other ministries such as the
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Welfare, the NMAC will retain a supervisory role.
This role will include supervising the collection of data relating to landmine and ERW injuries,
ensuring that the programmes are compliant with internationally approved practice, and that
the particular needs of landmine victims are not lost within generalised disability
programmes. The MRE unit will also make sure that data related to victims that is collected
during community surveys for the IMSMA database, are consistent with the nationally-held
victim data.
The NMAC also note that a new convention on the rights of the people with disability, which
Sudan has signed, is due to be ratified. This will bring renewed attention on the issue of
victims in general within the country and is a sphere of activity in which NMAC has a clear
role to play. The activities of the NMAC in this regard will be supported by clear
governmental guidelines that define what exactly constitutes being „a victim‟, combined with
an advanced technical capacity for supervising the various activities associated with VA
such as trauma management, rehabilitation, psycho-social counselling and vocational
reintegration.

4.3

Future performance: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action. These include organisational and
operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and prioritisation, the
mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information management using
IMSMA and the handover of safe, cleared land, i.e. through ensuring quality of operations.
This part of the capacity assessment defines how the NMAC foresees discharging the
activities that relative to the specific governance of its mine action programme.
4.3.1

Accreditation and quality

The NMAC see that quality management is a tool for enhancing service delivery and that
standards are integral to the conduct of operations, because they are linked to who can, and
also cannot, undertake various mine action activities. Standards are also viewed as having
strong linkages to capacity development. The NMAC will thus use a system of accreditation
and quality management for international and national organisations that will be based on
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and NTSG. Because of their normative potential,
the NTSGs will be incorporated into the standardised metrics used by the Ministry of
Measurement and Standards. Once held by this ministry they can be used to further ensure
consistency of usage throughout Sudan. This quality assurance mechanism will be managed
by the Quality Management Unit which will quality assure activities included within the five
pillars of mine action. This will be staffed by military personnel but assisted by technical
advice from the functional departments themselves, for example MRE.
The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework is clear that aside from being registered by the
Humanitarian Aid Commission in Sudan, all organisations including national and
international NGOs, and commercial companies have to be accredited by the National Mine
Action Centres in Khartoum or Juba as relevant before they commence undertaking any
mine action operations in the Sudan.”22 In addition, quality assurance processes will ensure
“implementation of the national mine action standards in accordance with IMAS with the aim
to regulate mine action activities in the country.”23 Although the NTSGs will be used in the
accreditation for all clearance implementers, the accountability mechanisms used for either
state or non-governmental actors may well be different. In both cases, it is intended that
future legislation, adapted and applicable to mine action requirements and which refer to
NTSGs and other appropriate national standards will provide the clearest framework for
accreditation and quality assurance.
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For the State, clearance work will continue to be conducted by the Joint Integrated Demining
Units. Standing orders will continue to be given to ensure compliance with the NTSGs, and
NMAC quality assurance officers conduct site visits to ensure compliance to IMAS and
NTSGs. Accountability, in this particular situation, is thus based on a military judicial system;
negligence on behalf of the military can be addressed through existing legal mechanisms,
and in this manner government can be held to account. The national system is thus viewed
by the NMAC as providing a greater level of accountability than the external UN-system,
because it is felt that there are less consequences of negligence for operators working under
UN accreditation, and thus fewer rights for victims.
For national and international non-governmental organisations, the accreditation process will
involve a prequalification stage, which could include issuing requests for expressions of
interest, for example. This would require interested organisations to submit details on
experience, financing and so on. Following this, the IMAS-model organisational accreditation
would take place followed by field accreditation. The standard quality assurance mechanism
will then be used to assess whether the organisation remains compliant with the NTSGs.
4.3.2

Information management

Due to current embargoes, use of the Geographical Information System (GIS) software
element within IMSMA is restricted within northern Sudan due to the US trade embargo on
Sudan. While temporary IMSMA use is permitted under the trusteeship of the UNMAO, it is
not clear whether it will be able to be used by the NMAC alone as and when the UN leaves.
If it is not, the NMAC may have to resort to other tools to manage and manipulate hazard
and impact data in a spatial manner, or UNDP could act as trustee of the IMSMA GIS
software on behalf of the national authorities post-2011. Thus the information management
team sees itself subject to certain external constraints which will in-turn determine future
performance. [Note: it is understood that FMS - the developers of IMSMA - hope to get
agreement with US authorities to license IMSMA for use in northern Sudan.]
Regardless of the exact system used, information management will have a critical function
within the NMAC; the department will provide operators with information on contamination.
However, it will not actively collect data, data collection will be done through operators using
dedicated proformas. National military clearance organisations such as the JIDUs will also
have dedicated IMSMA officers (or equivalent) attached to the units to provide updates on
clearance progress.
4.3.3

Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

In general, financial resource mobilisation will vary with the economic situation of the
country, the political importance of mine action, and the willingness of bilateral donors to
provide support. The fortunes of clearance operations will also be strongly linked to
development efforts within the country. This includes the incidental requirements for
clearance in advance of development projects, such as construction in contaminated areas.
There are thus perceived linkages to general development initiatives and strategies.
With the exception of special projects such as JIDU operations, planning is likely to follow
the status quo of separate north-south operational work-planning, and clearance work will be
coordinated by an Operations Department which has liaison officers from the JIDUs. The
Operations Department will be the primary developers of yearly work-plans, and five year
documents such as the 2005-2011 plan, which will be used to solicit government funding.
Activities within the plans could include development of capacity within the JIDUs and
supporting the creation of new demining teams, in line with a strong militarised approach to
demining. In this regard, the NMAC may attempt to solicit equipment and materials in
support of JIDU demining operations.
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Related work on stockpile destruction will remain an ongoing process of reporting with
reactive activity on discovery of caches of mines – and destroying them in situ – therefore
there is reduced requirement for specific planning activity in this area. For other pillars of
mine action such as MRE and VA, planning and tasking will be conducted within specialised
departments in partnership with Operations and NMAC directors. Planning may also involve
the important governmental and civil society stakeholders, as well as representation from
international organisations such as UNICEF.

4.4

Assessment of current capacity: programme and project management

Following the analysis of the NMAC’s future capacity requirements across the five pillars of
mine action, an assessment is required to establish those areas of performance that can be
enhanced through intervention. The purpose of this assessment section is to those identify
areas of need, by making a review of actual, current performance across the critical
functional capacities at the NMAC.
The end states reveal a considerable amount of liaison and advocacy activity, strong
coordination mechanisms, and the ability to plan and monitor operations. This will require
organisational competency to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, assess needs and
create common visions for mine action, develop suitable policies and effective strategies. At
a more operational level, the NMAC will need to be able to manage its own activities and
initiatives as well monitor and evaluate the projects and programmes of others.
4.4.1

Engaging with stakeholders

The NMAC is competent in retaining linkages with national stakeholders. These include
central government departments such as the Ministries of Planning, Health, Education and
the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges. Within civil society, good relationships are
maintained with those national organisations conducting MRE, VA and advocacy-based
activities. In addition, the Sudanese Campaign to Ban Landmines has formal representation
within the National Mine Action Committee structure, and are co-located in the same
building. In terms of local government, state governors have significant input into mine action
operations and staff at the NMAC feel that these relationships are of great importance as the
ability to coordinate with military groups and negotiating access to controlled areas must be
well maintained. There is general consensus that the quality of relationships between
national organisations and the NMAC are sustainable and would not change significantly
over time.
With respect to foreign stakeholders such as UN Agencies, international organisations and
donor governments, engaging with stakeholders is a more complicated activity. This reflects
a combined lack of capacity on the part of some of the most interested and influential
external agencies (such as UNMAO) and not only the NMAC to engage effectively. This has
not been helped by formal processes which have developed in an exclusionary fashion. For
example, external stakeholders have trusteeship of the specific governance elements of the
programme and as a result the NMAC is circumnavigated by most international agencies
during resource mobilisation, accreditation and tasking processes. Regardless of the origins
of this deficiency, the ability for NMAC to engage in a full-bodied partnership with
international agencies working inside Sudan is a very pressing short-term requirement, and
thus an area which will require specific attention for capacity development.
Recommendation:
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Interdependencies between the external and national agencies
should be expanded to cover information exchange, joint work
processes (such as planning, tasking and accreditation), and
resource flows (information and financial). Engagement with
the NMAC should be considered an integral part of UN
operations. In this way, trust will be developed between the
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two sides, and operations will be conducted in a symbiotic
manner, rather than in a parallel fashion.
4.4.2

Assessing needs and building visions

Within the NMAC, there is an understanding of the formal needs assessment approach,
which requires the rational investigation of need within society, measured at a local level.
However, most prioritisation is driven by a top-down process that emanates from the central
executive or state governor level and this naturally reduces the perceived utility of such
approaches and thus their usages in the absence of external partners. For example, the
NMAC is responsible for collecting data from communities and state authorities in a
designated area, but tasks within that area are chosen that are politically expedient as well
as humanitarian.
This system has two implications: (1) that decisions for allocating resources are based on
politics and not needs, which if this is in the interest of the electorate is acceptable from a
rights-based rather than a needs-based perspective, and (2) that heavy influencing of
technocratic processes such as humanitarian tasking could have implications for
humanitarianism, as less-vocal but nevertheless impacted communities could be excluded
from the delivery of services such as mine action.
Addressing needs in an effective manner requires aligning stakeholders with a common
vision. In it turn building a vision requires strong leadership, and the ability of those leaders
to coalesce diverse viewpoints around common interests. At the top of the national authority
structure, the Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs is highly influential in developing
policy for the organisation. This executive level could be supported by the National Mine
Action Committee by incorporating a wider range of central government interests. This may
help to facilitate dialogue, exchange of information and other resources between northern
and southern mine action authorities. At present, the relationship between the two centres is
of a formal, nature, defined through interaction in military-led tasking of the JIDUs, and
governed through the use of military liaison officers.
Recommendation:

The needs assessment process should be formalised. In this
way, incorporating the needs of impacted, and perhaps less
focal communities, can be made established and opportunities
for subordinating humanitarian objectives at the expense of
political ones may be reduced.

Recommendation:

Begin to reconvene the National Mine Action Committee. The
Committee is established to provide oversight and inclusive
policy-level support to the NMAC. It has representation from
civil society organisations, and the GOSS has de facto
representation through particular ministers that sit on the
Committee. By ensuring that the Committee meets regularly, it
is likely that work will remain aligned with justifiable
developmental or humanitarian objectives into the strategic
timeframe.

4.4.3

Developing policy and strategy

Policy and strategy development principles such as ensuring participation are not articulated.
In addition, formal opportunities for public-policy dialogue do not exist, and it is unclear
whether joint strategic planning sessions between northern and southern authorities could
be conducted without third-party facilitation. This has not been assisted by the Mine Action
Policy Framework, which although it sets out the roles and responsibilities of the mine action
organisations and actors in the country, and some general principles of action, does not
specify how policies and principles may be expanded. The result is a formal policy vacuum –
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at least visible policy – and this means that (a) technocratic processes may become
distorted through political pressure, and (b) reactive decision making may be arbitrary and
inconsistent, which could lead to unjust practice.
At a project level, the framework approach to planning is relatively well understood within the
NMAC. Directing staff are able to articulate the meanings of aims, missions, and objectives
in general, and are aware of the specific aims, missions and objectives of the NMAC. There
is familiarity with a range of techniques for developing policies and strategies, and this is
perhaps attributable to the participatory approaches employed in the development of the
Mine Action Strategic Framework, Mine Action Policy and attendance on a range of training
courses that cover programme and project management. However, it is therefore unclear
how normative these technical approaches are to the northern Sudanese planning
approach, and thus whether they are sustainable within a northern Sudanese context.
Culturally-speaking, dominant bureaucratic thinking places emphasis on technical work
planning on a yearly basis rather than at a strategic timeframe. Instead, a policy of reactive
adjustment to changes within the programme is more apparent. For example, the WauBabanossa railway project which called the JIDU capacity into being was apparently in
reaction to specific UN positioning regarding accreditation, quality management, and
contracting. In addition, strong executive authority that governs the activities of the NMAC
places little incentive on departmental strategy development; priority and policy is dictated by
external agencies such as the Ministry of Transport, Roads and Bridges or State level
authorities for specific mine/ERW clearance. While specialised technical departments such
as MRE appear to have a greater interest in long-term planning, the utility may well become
negated as these activities are increasingly mainstreamed into other government
departments and ministries.
Recommendation:

4.4.4

The current policy framework for Sudan should be expanded,
based on the principles set out within the Policy Framework.
While the National Mine Action Policy Framework provides the
general limits within which organisations can work, it only
defines who can work and what they can do, rather than how
they can do it. This means that the Policy does not specify how
activities will be developed, who they will be developed for,
and how they should be implemented. By creating a specific
set of policies that defined NMAC action, opportunities for
formalising and embedding local-level participation will present
themselves, and the potential for political interference. In
addition, relations between internal and external agencies will
become more predictable, and thus manageable.

Budgeting, managing and implementing

Accountancy and budget control are managed through the Administration and Finance
department. Between February 2007 and July 2008, the NMAC managed approximately
$5.5 million (US) worth of expenditure. This expenditure was mainly on heavy and specialist
equipment for the JIDUs; funding was mostly from national budgetary sources, or financial
assistance through UNDP. In addition to this, the NMAC prepares regular budgets for
personnel travel and subsistence allowances, and also provides direct financial budgeting
assistance to the JIDUs. The NMAC has also been able to plan and budget for the
development of a new headquarters building in Khartoum, as well as for a number of
regional offices. This suggests that there is a level of competency in developing budgets and
managing expenditure, but that there is room for improvement.
In terms of human resource management, the NMAC is covered by a range of normative
government policies and labour laws. Recruitment and selection are centralised, and
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appointments are made within existing government structures. There is no evidence to
suggest that individuals from non-governmental organisations can work-share within, or
transfer across to government departments such as the NMAC. Aside from generalised
employment policies, the NMAC has a comparatively open management style for a highly
militarised department. There are regular briefings and interdepartmental meetings,
extensive coordination with military units, and visits from members of parliament and other
government stakeholders.
The NMAC does not claim to be an implementing agency. However it is involved directly in
planning and tasking, for example, in the tasking of national NGOs for MRE in conjunction
with UNMAO, with facilitation from UNICEF. For the limited operational tasking processes in
NMAC – in the current scope of work – there is a planning officer who also has responsibility
for tasking. The planning officer is supported by a finance and logistics section, which is also
used to provide direct support to the JIDUs when they are on operations. During operations
of the JIDUs, IMSMA officers are also deployed to the field. This is so that they can report
directly to the NMAC on the progress of operations and this allows the NMAC a greater
degree of control over implementation. For more sizeable operations, the NMAC draws on
logistical support from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs.
Recommendation:

Where possible, external agencies should attempt to conduct
organisational development of the Administration and Finance
Departments within the NMAC. This should include
accountancy, book-keeping as well as preparing and
managing budgets. Since the systems are normative to
standard governmental procedures, intervention should seek
to augment and reinforce existing mechanisms, rather than to
overhaul or completely change current practice.

Recommendation:

Establish a human resource policy for the NMAC, which
reflects the realities of the prevailing system but which also
follows the intent of the Strategic Framework for mine action in
Sudan. This policy should establish the former working
arrangements of personnel within the NMAC, including: their
selection
and
recruitment,
job-sharing
possibilities,
performance review procedure, length of service and the
manner by which they should be trained and developed.

Recommendation:

The UNMAO and UNICEF officers in charge of MRE should
continue to provide assistance in terms of planning support to
the NMAC. As far as possible, NMAC staff should also
continue to be involved in the management, monitoring and
evaluation activities associated with these plans. This will build
interdependencies as well as ensure the flow of established
practice in these areas.

Recommendation

External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted
organisational development of the Logistics Department within
the NMAC. Activities should reflect the current and future scale
and scope of NMAC resources, e.g. fleet of cars, facilities and
the type and amount of equipment in the stores.

4.4.5

Monitoring and evaluation

Staff within the NMAC are aware of the importance of monitoring and evaluating projects. As
an institution designed for supervision and coordination, they see this as a core component
of their work. Staff recognise that the ability to monitor and evaluate is tied to (a) a
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developed understanding of the technical task at hand, for example the technical
requirements of reporting and cataloguing mines; and (b) skill in evaluation, and
understanding and demonstrating attribution of impacts, for example it was stated by the
MRE team that there were shortfalls in developing monitoring and evaluation packages that
could explore the consequences of social intervention in detail. This is a state-driven request
for further development in these areas and implies a desire to move away from the relatively
constrained notions of process driven, quantitative evaluation that tends to dominate
discussion of monitoring and evaluation in mine action. However, there was no
demonstrated understanding of the need for participation in monitoring and evaluation and
its potential for learning and developing capacity.
Recommendation:

External agencies should support the NMAC request for a
more nuanced understanding of policy development and
impact analysis. Intervention should address the manner by
which policies are created and developed, the constituencies
they serve, and the constituencies that they create.

Recommendation:

Wherever possible, external agencies should embed a
participatory approach into developing NMAC policy.
Participation could extend to the use of beneficiaries and other
mine action organisations (e.g. from civil society sector), where
appropriate.

4.5

Assessment of current capacity: general governance

General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific
governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. The purpose
of this part of the assessment of current capacity is to outline the general governance
environment within the NMAC, in terms of facilitating or constraining future performance, and
the permissiveness towards intervention and positive change.
Most staff appointments are made through military mechanisms or through recruitment from
a pool of retired military personnel. Heads of department have thus demonstrated
competency in military service, and since mine action is viewed primarily through a security
lens, the appointment of senior officers reflects the political importance of mine action. Other,
non-military staff positions such as the director of the MRE department are competent.
However, while the appointment system can be said to be generally meritocratic, talented
staff within certain fields such as information management, are not often found within state
structures. This is due to the lower salaries available to skilled Information Technology
workers compared with the private sector. There is thus a risk that appointments to certain
critical posts such as within the information management team may be less based on
competency and more on other factors; and that rotations of staff can produce capacity gaps
within the organisational structure which will impact on performance.
In the early stages of organisational development of the NMAC, decision-making was a topdown process. This may be attributable to the military background of personnel, which
strongly influences organisational culture. However with placements of staff on a range of
management courses, including senior and middle management courses, changes in
institutional culture have been observed. While there is still as centralised dimension to
decision making, there are now regular meetings between the director and staff during
which, issues are discussed, agreement reached and decisions taken. Compared with other
governments in the wider region, decision-making can be considered participatory in spirit.
The NMAC thus has the capability to take informed decisions on a wide range of issues
without difficulty. On matters of political significance, executive decisions are taken by the
State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs.
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This ability to make decisions may be linked to a greater levels of accountability vested in
individual decision makers, which has been developed through an good understanding of
boundaries of responsibility. Once apprised of the boundaries in which they work, staff are
able to speak their mind on work-related matters, in a relatively unhindered fashion. While
ultimate accountability is vested within the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, the director
and his staff are able to take responsibility for actions. For example, MRE, VA and
Information Management departments are able to take decisions on matters relating to dayto-day issues, as well as provide input into planning processes with other agencies.
The NMAC is not specifically mandated for higher-level policy development, this is the
responsibility of the National Mine Action Committee. The Committee includes
representation from Civil Society organisations, e.g. the Sudan Campaign to Ban
Landmines. However, for as long as the Committee does not meet regularly, direct public
access to policy development will continue to be limited. This is not to say that public access
to policy does not occur. State governors are able to influence the work plans of both the
NMAC and the UNMAO, through a consultation process via the NMAC. Since tasks and
requests are often of a political or developmental character rather than of an overtly
humanitarian nature, a degree of interaction between local government and the community
leaders within those states is reported to occur. That being said, instituting a formal
mechanism of public access through civil society organisations, through the Committee
would raise the effectiveness of public policy dialogue.
There are limits to the degree that political influence over the technocratic process can be
said to be beneficial. Owing to the political interest in mine action – defined through the CPA,
and consolidated by its visibility and the large funding streams that support the programme –
there is a high level of political interest. To-date, the developments may be seen as positive
since they provide a counterbalance to the development-focussed priority-setting agenda of
the NMAC as it takes the majority of its tasks from the Ministry of Transport Roads and
Bridges. However, it may mean that decisions are not taken in the interests of
humanitarianism, nor in terms of efficiency or effectiveness of operations. Although if the
majority of high-to-medium humanitarian tasks in northern Sudan are cleared by 2014 this
may not pose any particular problems.
Recommendation:

The NMAC should create an institutionalised knowledge
management system, which ensures that skills and knowledge
are not lost with reallocation of staff. This could include a
system whereby changes to departmental staffing
arrangements are staggered to ensure that employees can
transfer skills between one another. It could also mean
preparing documented handover notes. The creation of formal
policies, systems and procedures that define the NMAC will
also enhance continuity of service delivery. This is because
personnel will need to refer to established systems and
procedures rather than provide ad hoc solutions which may
well vary in quality and consistency.

Recommendation:

The National Mine Action Committee should begin to
reconvene regularly, and formal mechanisms for public policy
dialogue should be established within NMAC systems and
procedures. While the Committee will provide an oversight and
accountability mechanism, as well as the opportunity for
formalised civil society participation in the policy development
process, more operational level systems and procedures that
incorporate the views and opinions of beneficiaries and other,
micro-level stakeholders will ensure that macro-level policy is
being implemented in a just and equitable manner.
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4.6

Assessment of current capacity: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action – the core business of a national
authority. This part of the capacity assessment therefore defines the NMAC’s progress
towards achieving the required levels of performance in the regulation and management of a
mine action programme.
4.6.1

Accreditation and quality

Operations and quality assurance staff are comfortable discussing the purpose and wider
aims of monitoring and evaluation operations in mine action. In addition they can make
suggestions as to how currently accredited organisations do, or do not, represent good
quality in terms of efficiency or effectiveness. It was clear from discussions that a nationallyled accreditation process could become focused on the need to demonstrate organisational
effectiveness and value for money.
Staff appear familiar with the NTSGs. For example the MRE guidelines were viewed by
national staff as being technically sufficient and fit for purpose. In addition the direct
organisational links with the JIDUs through defence channels means that there is a feeling of
operational understanding of the NTSGs. These factors imply that capacity exists to critically
engage with the standards. What is lacking is an demonstrated ability (to external
stakeholders) to ensure implementation of the NTSGs. However, the lack of evidence does
not necessarily mean that there is a lack of capacity. There has been a traditional reluctance
from the UNMAO to acknowledge the existence and operations of the JIDUs and thus no
serious effort to understand their working practices. Nevertheless, the NMAC should be a
position to take over the quality management and accreditation duties of the UNMAO, and in
both areas of activity they are yet unproven.
From a separate UN standpoint there is also no evidence that the NMAC has any intention
of accrediting JIDUs. It is possible that if the Wau-Babanossa incident had not resulted in
disengagement, UN agencies could have maintained enough leverage to persuade this to
be otherwise. However, in the current absence of consensus on this matter – and a
reluctance to discuss it openly – it may now remain to develop other forms of accountability
system for both JIDU personnel and victims of negligence, such as through current
legislation.
Recommendation:

Quality management staff within the NMAC should begin to
demonstrate their familiarity with the NTSGs, to quality
management staff within external agencies. In turn, external
agencies such as the UNMAO should provide opportunities for
creating interdependencies between quality management staff
between the two organisations – potentially through a projectbased approach.

Recommendation:

Quality assurance staff should become involved in the process
of accrediting and assuring quality on the current set of
organisations conducting clearance in northern Sudan. This
should be a gradual process that begins with basic training,
secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be
gradually transferred, for example initially performing
organisational accreditation in an assisted manner, then
unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and
unmonitored fashion.

Recommendation:

The NMAC should formalise and make explicit its position on
the quality management and potential accreditation of the
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JIDUs. Once accreditation and the processes that
accreditation supports: protection for beneficiaries; confidence
in performance; and protection for demining agencies, are
understood, then external agencies and other stakeholders
can begin to integrate into wider governance and judicial
reform initiatives (e.g. a current UNDP programme of
enhancing local level awareness of the justice system)
4.6.2

Information management

The current information management system within the NMAC is paper-based. This is
consistent with the information management arrangements across other government
departments. The capacity of the NMAC for actively managing information using sector
specific databases such as the IMSMA is currently assessed to be low. This is said to be
due to the low availability of military NMAC staff for training due to other work commitments.
In addition, the requirement of NMAC IMSMA operators to travel from Khartoum to the
UNMAO regional office in Kadugli where data entry for the northern sector takes place has
exacerbated the difficulties in extensive training.
Training on the operational use of IMSMA and the Quality Assurance database is conducted
every year and this has had some impact. So while there is a better understanding of how to
employ IMSMA in the field, there is little capacity for inputting and manipulating data,
creating maps, conducting spatial analysis and extracting other types of data from the
IMSMA. Because the IMSMA database is a live system and of such importance to all
demining efforts in the country, national or otherwise, there is a reluctance to decentralise its
management. This makes sense for operational reasons, as it ensures the quality of
information in the database, but it does not necessarily provide the right conditions for
access to for NMAC staff.
Owing to ongoing sanctions on Sudan, there is also the issue of ownership of software for
GIS. As it currently stands, the UNMAO is a custodian of the GIS software, however it is not
allowed to transfer this to national ownership under the currently politico-security conditions
currently in-force.
Recommendation:

The UNMAO should consider whether it is essential to continue
to have data input for IMSMA at the Kadugli regional office. It is
recommended to align operations and the information
management centre of operations with those of the NMAC and
the SSDC respectively; it is unlikely that the location of Kadugli
represents as sustainable location for IMSMA data entry as
neither the NMAC nor the SSDC are necessarily likely to
continue to use it beyond the end of the mandate. The current
system is a potential constraint to national performance in this
area.

Recommendation:

IMSMA staff should become involved in the process inputting
and managing data on the current set of organisations
conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This should be a
gradual process that begins with basic training and
secondments followed by advanced courses. Responsibilities
should be gradually transferred, for example initially managing
data and creating graphical products in an assisted manner,
then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and
unmonitored fashion.
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Recommendation:

4.6.3

The UNMAO IMSMA operators, in conjunction with their
counterparts from the NMAC should begin investigating
potential alternatives to the IMSMA system. These systems
should be certified for use in northern Sudan (under current
sanctions in-force on the country), and provide a sufficient level
of information management capacity to sufficiently run mine
action operations.

Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

The primary development in terms of planning in Sudan for mine action is the development
of the Multi-Year Work-Plan document. This plan is designed to demonstrate the attainment
of obligations outlined under the Ottawa commitments over multiple years. It draws in all
actors and main stakeholders in Sudan, and many different groups were involved in its
development. The NMAC played a role in the development of the plan, but as of yet, they do
not have ownership of the plan and at the time of writing, perceive it more as a UN-tool
rather than a national one.
Most other work-planning is on a yearly basis, there is also reactive project planning activity
in response to political directives, e.g. clearance tasks in support of development or political
processes. Plans involve substantive finance and logistics components, and they are
demonstrated to be workable through the operation of the JIDUs. The NMAC staff are
confident in their abilities to plan within the limits of the information and tools available to
them. There is no demonstrated competency in using IMSMA to assist planning, however
until the Landmine Impact Survey project is completed, the ability of both national and
international agencies to task against impact is limited.
The ability to task clearance organisations does not explicitly rest with the NMAC. JIDU
activities are determined by the State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs who is chairman of the
National Mine Action Committee, and operations are implemented directly through military
channels. However, the NMAC does have the ability to adapt the requirement, and make
suggestions for amending the clearance task. The NMAC has a monitoring and reporting
role, rather than a direct tasking one. However, there is some tasking of national
organisations within the MRE and VA pillars.
With assistance from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the NMAC has been able to
mobilise national resources for clearance tasks. Core funding for positions within the NMAC
are also maintained through central financing processes, and these have generally been
satisfactory. For as long as mine action remains relevant in Sudan, there is no evidence to
suggest that the government budgets would not be able to support the core components of
the NMAC. However, there will almost certainly be a requirement to lobby for increased
external funding for specific clearance projects. If the NMAC does not demonstrate value for
money, professionalism and impact, it will not necessarily receive financial support from the
government. External funding sources that have presented themselves as potential revenue
streams include the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
Recommendation:
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Planning ability should be prioritised in the capacity
development process. Staff should also be made aware of how
to link their resource requirements to objectives, and be able to
articulate needs to donors in a considered manner, i.e. a
resource mobilisation strategy should be devised and
implemented. The Multi-Year Work Plan is a suitable tool for
training in this area, however it is critical that the principal
authors of the plan take time to integrate the NMAC planning
officers and senior managers into the process.
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Recommendation:

The NMAC should continue to lobby the government for
financial support. This can be supported by UN agencies, by
demonstrating the potential for NMAC performance both
externally to donors and internally to other government
departments. By encouraging the performance of the national
authorities, the UN will improve their chances of sustainability.

Notes to Section 3:
21.

22.
23.

Under the terms of entry, organisations registered by the Humanitarian Aid Commission are entitled to bring
equipment into the country without taxation, customs or other import duties. Under this arrangement these
organisations are obliged to leave machines and other assets for the use of the Sudanese government. The
UN operates under a different system and is not subject to the same conditionality.
The Sudan Mine Action Policy Framework, May 2006, Para 16
Ibid., Para 22 (5)
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 5: ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
THE SOUTH SUDAN DEMINING COMMISSION/AUTHORITY
5.1

Overview and entry level

5.1.1 The SSDC is an independent government institution which reports directly to the
Vice-Presidency. It is composed of five commissioners supported by a Director General who
manages the Authority. The SSDC therefore represents a complex mix of institutional
interests and as a result, the organisation is subject to strong political influence. Since the
SPLM/A is the primary political and military force within the southern part of the country,
there are significant linkages to the military, specifically the military engineering units and
this is represented in the appointments of senior military officers to the commissioner posts.
Like all other formal state structures in southern Sudan, the SSDC has been assembled from
first principles. This has meant the creation of completely new roles and responsibilities for
personnel within the organisation and the recruitment of staff, either directly across from
SPLM/A, or from related organisations.
5.1.2 At the first roundtable meeting, the management team from the SSDC felt it would be
appropriate to use the human resource level as an entry point for analysis and assessment.
There was a general consensus that organisational capacity is at the moment, merely the
sum of the capabilities of each member of staff within the SSDC, and therefore an analysis
of individual capabilities and performance would be more meaningful. As such, the
performance appraisal of specific members of staff was used to elicit information of current
capacity, predict future performance and thus establish capacity development priorities. To
ensure continuity, a standard performance appraisal sheet prepared by the SSDC was used
for the exercise. Performance appraisals were conducted for ten employees within the
organisation. At the end of the performance appraisal process, a further roundtable
discussion was held with the senior directing staff to discuss the initial findings and to agree
the way ahead. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff throughout the
organisation on an on-going basis.

5.2

Future performance: pillars of mine action

This part of the capacity assessment defines the future requirements of each mine action
pillar. It describes the setting within which SSDC will be required to regulate and manage
mine action in southern Sudan.
5.2.1

Clearance

The southern regions are the most heavily mined parts of the country and will thus continue
to represent a clearance challenge for some time to come. The majority of the clearance
operations have been road-clearance tasks that allow access for UN and other civilian
vehicles, and future priorities will turn towards demining in support of impacted local
communities. Clearance will require a growing national demining capacity. A large number of
former humanitarian deminers are currently unemployed and they will be selected, refreshed
and deployed within national organisations such as SIMAS, OSIL and SLR. A number of
international organisations are also likely to be in-country. In addition, JIDU personnel draw
military pay, and are provided with rations so they represent a sustainable option for
clearance. They will be utilised after receiving assistance and support, for example in
becoming accredited.

5 November 2008

5-1

Chapter 5 (v2.4)

As the governmental focal point for demining, the SSDC will have a coordinating role for
clearance operations and will be involved in the tasking of mine clearance organisations. It
will lead a priority setting process within the southern Sudan Mine Action Working Group
which is envisaged to be chaired by the SSDC. SSDC policy may well be impacted upon by
a process of decentralisation of government authority to the state level – a process which is
being undertaken throughout southern Sudan. From a centralisation perspective, there may
be room for responding to joint policy directives from the National Mine Action Committee
which is located in the North, and which has representation from SPLM ministers. This may
prove difficult as the Committee rarely meets, and de facto has little influence.
As part of its clearance-related responsibilities, the SSDC will lead on the development of
procedures for making the hazardous area data in southern Sudan more realistic, and thus
achievable. For example, the current survey data will be reviewed and augmented with more
accurate surveys, as there is a pressing need for area reduction; impact data will be
continually reviewed to take into account population migrations and development of
communities. Procedures that support this process, for example a national standard for the
handover of non-cleared land, which is consistent with the new IMAS 08.2024, will be
developed.
5.2.2

Mine Risk Education

The principal MRE capacity will be trained school teachers who will deliver MRE to
schoolchildren who will then bring awareness-raising messages home to parents and
relatives. The goal is to achieve a completely mine-aware generation. In order to achieve
this goal, MRE will have been completely mainstreamed into the curricula of standing
educational programmes which are supervised by the Ministry of Education. The SSDC will
provide on-going technical support to these mainstreamed initiatives.
Not all impacted communities will have been identified by the Landmine Impact Survey and
so a limited emergency capacity will be required to remain within the SSDC to support rapid
deployment MRE operations. The SSDC will coordinate and oversee the implementation of
MRE to these communities at risk, which will be identified on an as-needed basis. In support
of this role, the MRE department will be responsible for creating MRE plans and strategies in
partnership with national and international stakeholders.
5.2.3

Stockpile Destruction

While all known stocks of antipersonnel mines were destroyed in order to meet the
obligations of the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty (MBT), the potential for discovering significant
numbers of abandoned caches means that more mines may still come to light. Stockpile
destruction is seen as an ongoing process, which is closely linked to advocacy. The SSDC
will need to continue lobbying senior military commanders to ensure that any new landmines
that are discovered are reported, documented and destroyed. This mine action responsibility
will thus require close coordination with the SPLA and the general security apparatus.
5.2.4

Advocacy

With a referendum on the horizon, there is the continued possibility that southern Sudan will
choose to separate from the northern regions of the country. If such a situation is to occur,
the issue of compliance with the MBT will also need to be addressed, as the current, singlenation signature would be insufficient to meet the requirements of two nations. In the event
of southern Sudan becoming an independent state then it may be necessary to advocate for
the new Government to commit itself to signing the Treaty. Were a new state to be formed,
and were it to sign the MBT, then SSDC‟s responsibilities would shift from advocacy to
supporting the new Government meet its obligations as a State Party to the Treaty. The
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SSDC will be the governmental institution that would lead on the process of reaffirming
commitment to the MBT.
Although southern Sudan is currently held by the MBT with the SPLA previously committed
under the Deed of Commitment for non-state actors, attitudes and behaviours are difficult to
change, Agreement on the need to outlaw a military capacity such as landmines will not be
total. Continued advocacy will be required to ensure that antipersonnel mines are not viewed
as a legitimate choice of weapon. This will require building strong grass-roots support for the
MBT. The SSDC would be assisted by the formation of a civil society body equivalent to a
Southern Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines organisation that would act as a suitable
pressure group.
5.2.5

Victim Assistance

By 2011, most VA activities will have been completely mainstreamed into other government
departments. As these government departments develop and grow, they will begin to
implement a wide range of general disability programmes which can better serve the needs
and interests of disabled persons and their families. VA activities will continue to be steered
by a working group, which includes the SSDC, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of
Social Welfare.
Although VA may become part of the mainstream social welfare system in the form of
benefits and even compensation for injury, the SSDC will retain an oversight role on data
collection, so that information on mine victims remains accurate, and that data can be used
for both prioritisation and advocacy purposes. In addition, the VA department will scrutinise
the development of all VA teaching aids and awareness raising materials, to ensure that they
are compliant with international good practice, are sustainable and meet the needs of victims
and their families. In addition, specific projects may be monitored to understand the range
and numbers of beneficiaries, and the achievement of objectives. It is assumed that civil
society organisations which recognise landmine victims will also have an important role in
maintaining pressure on government to fully meet its obligations as a State Party to the Mine
Ban Treaty.

5.3

Future performance: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action. These include organisational and
operational accreditation, national mine action strategic planning and prioritisation, the
mobilisation of resources, the management of mine action information management using
IMSMA and the handover of safe, cleared land, i.e. through ensuring quality of operations.
This part of the capacity assessment defines how the SSDC foresees discharging the
activities that relative to the specific governance of its mine action programme.
5.3.1

Accreditation and quality

A large component of the SSDC mandate is the quality management of mine action,
including the accreditation of mine action implementing organisations. The SSDC see quality
management as a tool for enhancing service delivery, and accept that national mine action
standards as integral to the conduct of operations. The SSDC will thus use a quality
management system, including the accreditation of both international and national
organisations and this will based on the existing National Technical Standards and
Guidelines (NTSG). National standards that are based on IMAS represent a global
consensus on best practice in mine action. So long as they do not interfere or conflict with
national legislation, NTSGs provide a suitable mechanism for ensuring quality and
accountability. However, the mechanisms for achieving full accreditation of all national
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organisations including the JIDUs will require a cooperative approach from external agencies
who will aim to support – rather than limit – national efforts to participate.
The SSDC accreditation processes will also be concerned with financial accountability of
both NGOs and commercial organisations receiving both bilateral and multilateral funding,
for example through the UNMAS-managed Voluntary Trust Fund. National authorities need
to convince themselves of the value for money of clearance operations, and that they are
consistent and aligned with national aims and objectives. In addition to a review of standard
operating procedures, the organisational accreditation may therefore also require interested
organisations to submit details on experience, financing and so on. Following this, the IMASmodel organisational accreditation would take place followed by an operational accreditation.
The standard quality assurance mechanism will then be used to assess whether the
organisation remains compliant with the NTSGs. The quality process will be managed by
quality assurance officers who will monitor and evaluate all mine action activities for which
the SSDC is responsible post transition.
5.3.2

Information management

As the coordinator for all mine action activities in southern Sudan, the SSDC will be
supported by robust information management systems that are established within the SSDC.
An IMSMA department supported by trained operators located in all regional offices will
provide implementing partners and other interested groups with information on
contamination. The SSDC will collate, analyse and manage the information in IMSMA using
data collected by external organisations using standard proformas. Instead, it will store,
manage and analyse the data. Usage of the GIS software element within the IMSMA system
is not restricted within southern Sudan, thus the information management personnel within
the SSDC see themselves as future custodians of the existing IMSMA database as it is
currently constructed.
5.3.3

Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

The SSDC will have a strategic plan with a vision, mission and strategic objectives of mine
action in southern Sudan and have a developed understanding of how these objectives will
be met. This could include integrating with the Multi-Year Work-Plan, but this will not negate
the need for further work-planning for specific departments and technical functions such as
MRE.
Work on stockpile destruction will remain an ongoing process of reporting both
internationally to the States Parties to the MBT, and nationally to the national security
apparatus. As most activity in this area will be reactive activity on discovery of caches of
landmines there is reduced requirement for long-term planning activity in this area. For MRE
and VA, planning and tasking will be conducted within relevant departments in partnership
with Operations and SSDC Commissioners and the Director General. Planning may also
involve interested governmental and civil society stakeholders, as well as representation
from international organisations such as UNICEF.
International organisations will be required to have their mine action activities coordinated,
and will be specifically tasked by the SSDC who will distribute task identification numbers
and provide certificates of cleared land. The SSDC will have an effective, transparent and
accountable system for issuing and evaluating tenders, awarding contracts and monitoring
compliance. With the exception of special projects such as JIDU operations, clearance
planning is likely to follow the status quo of separate North-South operational work-planning.
Work will be coordinated by an Operations Department which will contribute to yearly workplans which can also be used to solicit government funding. Aside from clearance, activities
within the plans may include development of capacity within the SSDC.
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In terms of resource mobilisation, core funding for the SSDC will continue to come from the
government Donations for equipment, facilities development and up-keep, will be solicited
from international partners such as UNDP, wherever possible. Foreign governments will be
encouraged to support mine action in Sudan, although it is accepted that the majority of
external funding will continue to be on a bilateral basis directly from donors or multilaterallysourced and managed by the UN. In general, national sources of funding will be tied to the
perceived political importance of mine action, and the economic fortunes of the country.

5.4

Assessment of current capacity: programme and project management

Following the analysis of the SSDC’s future capacity requirements across the pillars of mine
action, an assessment is required to establish those areas of performance that can be
enhanced through intervention. The purpose of this assessment section is to those identify
areas of need, by making a review of actual, current performance across the critical
functional capacities at the SSDC.
Anticipated future performance reveals a need for supporting advocacy activity, strong
coordination mechanisms, and the ability to plan, monitor and evaluate operations. This will
require organisational competency to engage with a wide range of stakeholders, assess
needs and create common visions for mine action (including advocacy for the MBT) and
develop suitable policies and effective strategies. At a more operational level, the SSDC will
need to be able to manage its own activities and initiatives as well monitor and evaluate the
projects and programmes of others.
5.4.1

Engaging with stakeholders

The SSDC is developing linkages with national stakeholders including state governors, and
these parties have a significant input into the current mine action prioritisation process.
Engagement is enabled through formal mechanisms such as the Mine Action Working
Group, as well as through informal networks of contacts. These are characteristically
nascent arrangements due to the recent establishment of the southern Government in
general and a corresponding lack of awareness of the purpose and practice of mine action.
In the civil society sphere, the benefits of symbiosis between civil society and the state is an
idea that is specifically articulated within the SSDC and there is every indication that future
relationships will be harmonious; the SSDC appears to perform well in terms of engaging
with national NGOs. The perceived role of self-organised advocacy and pressure groups,
and their interaction with government are western-democratic in outlook, and it suggests that
cooperation and coordination with these entities will be effective.
Relationships with the principal external stakeholder, UNMAO mission, has been mostly
strained or non-existent. This reflects a lack of willingness as well as capacity, to engage
effectively on both sides. The result for the SSDC has been a reduced consistency and effort
in supporting, chairing and organising multi-stakeholder meetings, such as monthly
coordination meetings. It is not the purpose of this report to provide in-depth reasons for
reticence regarding collaboration and equitable decision-making with government, however it
may stem from (1) a lack of interdependency in work processes, (2) an emergency response
culture that pervades the UN mission, (3) leadership style incompatibility, (4) a desire to
avoid duplication of roles, and (5) perceived constraints arising from cooperation. The lack of
positive synergy and partnership represents one of the biggest constraints to deliberate
efforts for capacity development of the SSDC.
Recommendation:
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relationships, and fostering partnership, it is important not to
exacerbate tensions. If necessary interaction with SSDC
should become a formal policy instituted by the GOSS, and
where necessary supported by facilitating legislation. However,
the SSDC is strongly advised to develop a consistent approach
to organising, supporting and chairing meetings and working
groups.
Recommendation:

5.4.2

Engagement with the SSDC should not be viewed as a
constraint to be avoided. As the governmental focal point for
mine action in southern Sudan, emphasis should be placed on
creating genuine partnerships between UNMAO the SSDC.
This will require proactive attempts to foster equitable
relationships. Likewise, the SSDC should understand the
operational limitations, and an emergency-phase „culture‟
within UN organisations that have previously limited concerted
capacity development. They should also recognise current
willingness on behalf of the UN for engagement and should
capitalise
on
continued
opportunities
for
creating
interdependencies.

Assessing needs and building visions

Terms of reference (job descriptions) for all staff have been drafted, and a performance
appraisal system has been instituted. Most employees are generally aware of the need to
further develop their own knowledge, understanding and skills to enable them to improve
their own competencies and capabilities, and thus improve the performance of the SSC/A. At
an organisational level, departments are seen to be lacking in core functionality although no
comprehensive needs assessment has taken place of organisational performance. Within
the institutional environment, the SSDC is also able to identify constraints and opportunities
that impact on capacity and performance.
In terms of conducting needs assessment to support sound planning, discussions with staff
reveal that refugee movements, suspected levels of contamination, past coverage of
operations, and ongoing development activities should all guide prioritisation in some way.
However, the needs assessment process is largely intuitive, informal and lacks consistency;
there is little access to data, and knowledge of how to manipulate it. There is strong
commitment to future usage of empirical sources of data such as the Landmine Impact
Survey and planning processes which are rooted in a firm response to need. Within all
cases, priority is placed very much within impacted communities. The MRE and VA officers
at the UNMAO have provided some assistance in developing capacity in this area, and the
responsible manager for these areas at the SSDC feels that he has gained some limited
understanding of certain planning processes. However, there has been no consistent and
sustained attempt to integrate the MRE/VA manager and staff into the needs assessment
and planning process – they are invited to attend, rather than trained to lead these events.
This is a situation which has been aggravated by the separation of site between the UNMAO
and SSDC offices.
While needs identify the direction in which a public-service organisation should move,
leadership is required to move it. The leadership arrangement within the SSDC is complex.
Technocratic decision making, as opposed to political decision making, is invested within the
Authority element of the SSDC, which is currently headed by an acting Director General.
Decisions that have political ramifications are addressed by the group of five commissioners:
a chairperson, a deputy chairperson and three members. These persons may consult on any
technical matters that they feel appropriate. The commissioner positions are political
appointments, and there is thus a strong influence of politics on technical matters. In the
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absence of completely formalised reporting lines, and with an organisational structure that
can still be considered formative, this may be confusing to lower level staff, who seek clear
guidance and direction. It may also give rise to decision-making processes – which although
are consensual – may take some time to come about as heads of department seek to clarify
what they can and cannot do within a complex political context, even on lower-level and
technical issues.
In terms of leadership styles, there is an open and cordial atmosphere maintained between
junior and senior staff. At performance appraisals, junior and mid-level staff are encouraged
to identify problems and issues within their parts of the organisation and are happy to
engage in constructive criticism. This being said, the majority of senior appointments are
military appointments, and this has its own influence on organisational culture. The result is
that while there is an air of participation, and multi-dimensional feedback, decision-making is
a top-down process. There is thus a centralised management approach which may not
necessarily encourage high performance in complex, multi-stakeholder activities such as
mine action.
Recommendation:

External agencies should recognise the political environment in
which the SSDC operates, and understand that capacity
development practices requiring rapid institutional changes will
not work. Changes will come about through influence, rather
than direct instruction alone and this will be determined by the
quality of working relationship, for example through
experiential trust developed through interdependency.

Recommendation:

The UNMAO IMSMA and planning components should attempt
to integrate SSDC counterparts into their planning processes,
throughout all stages including needs assessments – not
simply on data consolidation and for approval of work-plans.
SSDC should be exposed to the entire process of using needs
to conduct spatial analysis to develop objectives and
subsequently derive action plans.

Recommendation:

The commissioners should attempt to create a formal policy
framework within which the Authority may operate. This will
free up time for the commissioners for higher-level matters, will
create clear boundaries of responsibility and will allow senior to
mid-level managers to make swifter decisions and judgement
calls.

5.4.3

Developing policy and strategy

At a project level, the framework approach to planning is relatively well understood in
principal by some but not all senior managers; but there is limited evidence that it is used in
practice. Directing staff are able to articulate the specific aim and mission of the SSDC; there
is familiarity with a range of techniques for developing policies and strategies. This is
perhaps attributable to the participatory approaches employed on a range of training courses
that cover programme and project management, and the previous work experience of these
senior staff in development-related fields. There is evidence to suggest that these
approaches will become normative to the southern Sudanese government institutions, which
are being developed along the principles of management within which, programmes of
results-based projects are well-used. However, within departments themselves, planning
ability is very weak. Some staff do not appear accustomed to thinking at a strategic
timeframe, and there is a lack of clarity as to the core components of a plan and how they
may be derived.
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It is unclear how far in advance operational work-planning will extend, current budgeting
systems suggest on a yearly basis. Policy and strategy development principles such as
ensuring participation are not articulated, yet formal mechanisms – such as the Mine Action
Working Group, and the multi-stakeholder yearly prioritisation process – are in place to
ensure a degree of participation is embedded within the process. Prioritisation policy and
strategy for clearance operations will be coordinated by the SSDC, with input from the Mine
Action Working Group which will include agencies such as the Ministry of Transport, Roads
and Bridges. In addition, although there has been some MRE and operations input (e.g. into
the yearly prioritisation process), there have been inconsistent opportunities for building
capacity within the SSDC with respect to planning.
Recommendation:

External agencies should capitalise on the consistency
between planning approaches accepted by the SSDC, and
their own, and begin to draw SSDC staff into the mainstream
planning process. For example, the SSDC should be given the
time and space to understand the Multi-Year Work Plan, and
then the opportunity to engage critically within it, on a powerneutral basis.

Recommendation:

Ensure that formal participatory mechanisms become
completely normative. This includes all multi-stakeholder
consultancy processes that are currently managed by the
UNMAO. This will help to ensure that future SSDC
mechanisms and processes are participatory in practice.

5.4.4

Budgeting, managing and implementing

Accountancy and budget control is managed through the Administration and Finance
department. However actual budget and occasional, supplementary budget development is
conducted by the senior directing staff within the SSDC. For the current year, the SSDC has
a budget of approximately $1.5 million. This implies an ability to mobilise a relatively large
amount national resources. There is also financial assistance towards facilities and transport
that is provided by UNDP, but in general there are large shortfalls in equipment such as
computers and vehicles, as well as for allowances for staff to travel to regional offices. The
lack of equipment and travel budget continues to pose a significant institutional constraint to
capacity development.
For the funds that it controls, the SSDC is able to prepare budgets for travel and subsistence
allowances for personnel. Officers within the finance department display an interest in their
work, and have an understanding of what they still need to achieve in terms of personal
career development. For example, accounting principles and budget control are understood
at a basic level, yet there is a recognised need to be able to enhance performance in these
areas, as well as adding extra competencies such as financial planning. There is thus a
nascent competency in developing budgets and managing expenditure.
In terms of human resource management, the SSDC is covered by a range of government
policies and labour laws. However, there is sometimes lack of clarity on which regulations on
general labour policy hold – central governmental or local organisational – and this is likely
to continue until the government systems become more mainstreamed. Labour regulations
do not include centralised recruitment of new staff. Recruitment and selection is conducted
by the SSDC, through a formal selection process: job notices are well advertised locally,
recruitment notices are played on the radio, interviews are held, and selection is made.
There is a genuine desire amongst senior staff to manage in accordance with established
“western” principals. Yet while there is a developed understanding amongst some senior
Commissioners and similar grades within the Authority, these ideas have not been obviously
communicated to more junior staff.
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The SSDC does not claim to be an implementing agency. However it participates in planning
and in the tasking of some national NGOs, for example, MRE in conjunction with UNICEF
and UNMAO. For the limited operational tasking processes in SSDC – for the current scope
of work – the Operations Department has responsibility for tasking. They are supported by
the Administration and Finance department, and a Logistics section. Logistical support within
the SSDC has only very basic operational competency which includes storekeeping,
purchasing of sundries, and the maintenance of simple records on equipment such as
computers which are held at the SSDC premises. There is no claimed ability for fleet
management, storage of large amounts of equipment or maintenance and care of largescale facilities.
Recommendation:

There are specific human-resource level actions that can be
immediately implemented to provide capacity development
“quick wins”. For example, self-identified opportunities for
personal career development which are achievable and
reasonable can be supported25; and which were identified
through the performance review process.

Recommendation:

External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted
organisational development of the Administration and Finance
Department within the SSDC. This should include improving
performance in accountancy and book-keeping as well as
preparing and managing budgets.

Recommendation:

External agencies should attempt to conduct concerted
organisational development of the Logistics Department within
the SSDC. Activities should be harmonised with the controlled
growth of the SSDC fleet of cars, facilities and the type and
amount of equipment in the stores.

Recommendation:

The UNMAO officers in charge of MRE and VA, should
continue to provide assistance in terms of planning support to
the SSDC. As far as possible, SSDC staff should also be
involved in the management, monitoring and evaluation
activities associated with these plans. Where possible the
SSDC should also make assets available so that their staff can
work with external agencies.

Recommendation:

The lack of funds for equipment such as computers and
vehicles means that there is a natural constraint to operations,
as well as capacity development activities. As a matter of
some urgency, the SSDC (with UNDP) should make an
inventory of required equipment, which is rationalised against
sound planning assumptions. Wherever possible, external
agencies should attempt to solicit the required equipment and
provide it in a controlled and sustained manager that is
appropriate for a combined improvement of performance with
growth.

5.4.5

Monitoring and evaluation

As an institution designed for supervision and coordination, the SSDC sees monitoring and
evaluation as a core component of its work. Senior staff view the standardised IMAS-based
approach, i.e. use of the NTSGs, as the basis for discussions on quality. However, there is
some confusion amongst lower level staff as to who should be accrediting demining
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organisations working in southern Sudan – they see duplication of their roles within the UN
and have questions regarding the purposes of the two organisations.
Within the functional departments, there is little demonstrated knowledge of the utility of
classical monitoring and evaluation systems for projects that are designed to generate social
impacts, such as MRE or VA. Participatory approaches to evaluation and the subsequent,
beneficial outcomes of accountability, learning and capacity development are not explicitly
recognised.
Recommendation:

5.5

Skills and knowledge for monitoring and evaluation should be
transferred to those VA, MRE and other project-based staff
working towards external, social goals. Basic tools and
techniques should be supplemented with supporting
information on how participatory evaluation can be used to
heighten accountability, ensure learning and improve capacity.

Assessment of current capacity: general governance

General governance refers to the broader environment which enables the specific
governance systems, processes and procedures to be developed and applied. The purpose
of this part of the assessment of current capacity is to outline the general governance
environment within the SSDC, in terms of facilitating or constraining future performance, and
the permissiveness towards intervention and positive change.
Decades of conflict means that like most organisations in southern Sudan, the SSDC has
faced considerable difficulties in finding competent staff. Governmental positions are not as
well paid as similar positions within commercial or international organisations, and this has
added to the difficulties. For purposes of expediency and perhaps political necessity, a range
of executive appointments were made when the commission was established. At that time
the SPLA was the only credible pseudo-governmental organisation operating in the country
and most of the commissioners were drawn across from the military. Since the military
commissioners are all of a relatively senior rank, it reflects the political importance attached
to these positions. Senior non-military staff were selected on the basis of experience within
mine action, or knowledge of socio-economic development programmes. More recently,
selection procedures for later staff hires, are formalised and presumably meritocratic.
Employment notices, interview processes, and the public announcement of successful
candidates are a critical step towards institutionalising a rational-legal organisation that
ensures efficiency and effectiveness. Performance appraisal activities, which are still
formative and ad hoc, are also an important addition for staff development and promotion
within the SSDC.
The mixture of military personnel and civilian professionals, sometimes gives rise to
contradictory organisational culture in which liberal, new-management practices and ideas
are enforced with top-down executive authority. This is facilitated by a hybrid organisational
structure that has merged the Commission with the Authority26. This convergence of
organisations is not merely physical, but culturally embedded in terms of organisational
values, attitudes and beliefs. A classical, policy-forming Mine Action Authority creates the
political space for technical service delivery by a Mine Action Centre, and automatically
produces a natural vertical accountability mechanism between the two organisations.
However, the current political/technical mandate of SSDC is amorphous, and the
accountability mechanism is decentralised across multiple locations within the organisation.
The result is that decision making processes can become obfuscated and technical
decisions may quickly become political. In the current security climate, there may be good
justification for keeping mine action matters close to the attention of politico-military
organisations such as the SPLA. Yet under future conditions of peace and prosperity,
decision making would become needlessly hampered.
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Recommendation:

Continue on the current path of meritocratic recruitment.
Performance appraisals should be applied to senior directing
staff as well as mid-to-junior level staff within the Authority.
Political appointments of commissioners will be complemented
by a growing appreciation of mine action, and the increasing
technical competency of the Authority itself.

Recommendation:

As far as possible, the Commissioners should try to create a
formalised and well-understood political framework, within
which the technical departments within the Authority can
operate. This will greatly facilitate decision-making and
increase the potential for rapid service delivery.

5.6

Assessment of current capacity: specific governance

Specific governance includes the systems, processes and procedures which enable the
national authorities to regulate and manage mine action – the core business of a national
authority. This part of the capacity assessment therefore defines the SSDC’s progress
towards achieving the required levels of performance in the regulation and management of a
mine action programme.
5.6.1

Accreditation and quality

Apart from the some individuals on the senior directing staff, operations and quality
assurance staff are not yet comfortable discussing the purpose and wider aims of monitoring
and evaluation operations in mine action. Quality assurance and operations staff are
unfamiliar with the NTSGs, and this can be attributed to a lack of skills and knowledge of
mine action activities. This may also be due to a lack of awareness of the purpose of
standards in general and IMAS in particular. This is not helped by a lack of equipment and
facilities which would allow participation in field activities, and this is due to a lack of funding.
Quality assurance performance is also hampered by the fact that the SSDC are not currently
responsible for accreditation in practice.
Recommendation:

5.6.2

Quality Assurance staff should become involved in the process
of accrediting and assuring quality on the current set of
organisations conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This
should be a gradual process that begins with basic training,
secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be
gradually transferred, for example initially performing
organisational accreditation in an assisted manner, then
unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and
unmonitored fashion. In order to support this process, it is
strongly recommended that the SSDC ensure that Quality
Assurance staff gain a comprehensive knowledge of mine
action. In addition to manual demining, this should include
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), mechanical demining,
and use of mine detection dogs.

Information management

The current information management system within the SSDC is paper-based, although
middle and senior-level staff communicate using email. The capacity of the SSDC for
actively managing information using sector specific databases such as IMSMA is currently
assessed to be generally very low, although potential for doing so rests with some
employees.
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Training on the operational use of IMSMA and the Quality Assurance database is conducted
every year and this has had some impact. Certain staff are able to open IMSMA, locate
dangerous areas and extract a limited amount of data. One staff member with a more
developed understanding is able to check on the accuracy of information in the database
relating to his region of operations, and occasionally reports discrepancies to the UNMAO
IMSMA department. So while there is a better understanding of how to employ IMSMA in the
field, there is no demonstrated capacity for inputting and manipulating data, creating maps,
conducting spatial analysis and extracting other types of data from the IMSMA.
Because the IMSMA database is a live system and of such importance to all demining efforts
in the country, national or otherwise, there is a reluctance to decentralise its management.
This makes sense for operational reasons, as it ensures the quality of information in the
database, but it does not necessarily provide the right conditions for access to for SSDC
staff. This is especially the case since the UNMAO IMSMA staff and SSDC offices are now
some distance apart.
Recommendation:

IMSMA staff should become involved in the process inputting
and managing data on the current set of organisations
conducting clearance in southern Sudan. This should be a
gradual process that begins with basic training and
secondments followed by advanced courses. Responsibilities
should be gradually transferred, for example initially managing
data and creating graphical products in an assisted manner,
then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an unassisted and
unmonitored fashion.

Recommendation:

The UNMAO should consider whether it is essential to
continue to have data input for IMSMA at the Kadugli regional
office. It is recommended to align operations and the
information management centre of operations with those of the
NMAC and the SSDC respectively; it is unlikely that the
location of Kadugli represents as sustainable location for
IMSMA data entry as neither the NMAC nor the SSDC will
continue to use it beyond the end of the mandate.

5.6.3

Planning, tasking and resource mobilisation

The primary development in terms of planning in Sudan for mine action is the development
of the Multi-Year Work-Plan document. This plan is designed to demonstrate the attainment
of obligations outlined under the Ottawa commitments over multiple years. It draws in all
actors and main stakeholders in Sudan, and many different groups were involved in its
development. The SSDC played a role in the development of the plan, but as of yet, they do
not have ownership of the plan and at the time of writing, and perceive it more as a UN-tool
rather than a national one.
Staff throughout the SSDC show an appreciation of the concepts of contamination and
impact, and there is an agreement that landmine impacted communities are the basis from
which planning and prioritisation should take place. However, there is no demonstrated
competency in using empirical data in planning processes. However until the Landmine
Impact Survey project is completed, the ability of both national and international agencies to
task against impact is limited. In terms of other planning approaches, there is limited
competency particularly in being able to link resource requirements to specific objectives;
staff members are aware of their limitations.
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Despite the general lack of planning ability, the SSDC is keen to begin tasking agencies.
However in without access and control of the IMSMA system it is unable to assign agencies
with task identification numbers; in the absence of a credible quality management system, it
is also unable to provide clearance certificates. The result is that despite a will for tasking,
and an apparent compliance on the part of certain international implementing partners to
engage with the SSDC on a tasking and certification basis, it will require skills development
in planning and quality assurance and access to specific IT tools to undertake this role.
However, outside the traditional, UN-led tasking system, the SSDC has input into the tasking
of JIDU operations in areas that are of joint northern-southern control, or indeed clearance in
southern areas.
Core funding for positions within the SSCD/A is maintained through central financing
processes. However, financing does not appear to be sufficient enough to remove certain
key organisational constraints such as lack of transport. While mine action remains relevant,
there is no evidence to suggest that the government budgets would not be able to support
the core component of the SSDC. Government organisations such as the JIDUs are already
funded with soldiers drawing salaries from military sources. The SSDC thus views the JIDUs
as a sustainable clearance option, and an asset that should be used to expand clearance
operations. The SSDC is thus able mobilise a certain amount of funding from national
budgets, and that in terms of clearance options there is a partially-funded national clearance
asset available for use. These two factors imply a level of financial sustainability. There is
also no indication that international financial support would completely dissipate on the
departure of the UN mission. Agencies such as UNDP will still be available to continue
providing support, and the Voluntary Trust Fund may also receive ear-marked funds for
Sudan. Individual donors with specific interests in the development of national capacity may
also choose to continue funding SSDC development and other national operations.
Recommendation:

Priority should be placed on generating advance
understanding of the purpose and potentials of the Multi-Year
Work-Plan; the SSDC senior staff should understand how they
can engage with the plan and use it as a tool for eliminating
impact, developing their own capacity, engaging with other
stakeholders, and mobilising resources. Understanding how to
link empirical data on need to the allocation of assets over time
is a critical activity. Planning ability should be prioritised in the
capacity development process, across all departments. Staff
should also be made aware of how to link their resource
requirements to objectives, and be able to articulate needs to
donors in a considered manner.

Recommendation:

IMSMA and Quality Assurance capacity should receive
particular attention within the capacity development process.
Without these skills and abilities, the SSDC cannot begin
tasking and issuing clearance certificates.

Recommendation:

The SSDC should continue to lobby the government for
financial support. This work should be linked in with future
advocacy initiatives designed to draw public attention – and
thus public pressure – to the dangers of antipersonnel
landmines.
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Notes on Section 5:
24.
25.
26.

This IMAS is yet to be formally endorsed by the IMAS Steering Committee
For example, this capacity assessment process identified a night-school accountancy course available in
Juba, at a cost of approximately $600.
This can loosely be considered to represent a combined Mine Action Authority with a Mine Action Centre as
they are classical conceived
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 6: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES
6.1

Introduction

The gap between the current capacities of NMAC and SSDC, and the required future needs
of the Sudan Mine Action Programme, was discussed in Sections 4 and 5. The
recommendations provide a list of issues which need to be addressed and actions which
need to be taken.
The recommendations were discussed with NMAC, SSDC and UNMAO, and from these
discussions the recommendations were grouped into themes. These themes include: (1)
specific activities to be undertaken by the national authorities and external agencies, such as
developing policy and legislation, and (2) principles of good practice that cross-cut across all
activities such as the development of collaboration. These themes were then arranged as
priorities under three categories: the enabling environment, organisational capacity and the
development of human resources. In order to develop a realistic capacity development plan,
not every recommendation has been integrated into the list of priorities.

6.2

Enabling environment priorities

The enabling environment includes Government Ministries, civil society, international
organisations and other entities which can influence the way in which the NMAC, SSDC and
UNMAO can regulate and manage mine action in Sudan.
Priority is being given to actions which will enable the development of national capacities
and will encourage the rapid transfer of regulatory and management responsibilities from the
United Nations to national authorities.
Priority One

Improve existing systems and procedures for the regulation and
coordination of mine action in Sudan, and enable capacity
development and transition to full national ownership
The UN Mine Action Steering Committee in Sudan represents a
suitable oversight mechanism within the UN system; aside from
setting an example of good practice, it provides the most appropriate
forum for development of a common position on transition, and the
best oversight and accountability mechanism for implementation of the
process. It should oversee organisational changes as the UNMAO
itself transitions from managing emergency post-conflict mine action to
an arrangement where mine action is undertaken in support of
nationally-led reconstruction and development.
The National Mine Action Committee (which forms part of Sudan‟s
NMAA) represents the most appropriate national mechanism for (1)
creating interdependency between northern and southern
programmes, (2) ensuring input from civil society into formal policy
development, and (3) ensuring that the national authorities meet their
objectives in a justifiable and technically defensible manner. UN
agencies and national authorities should encourage the Committee to
reconvene and meet on a regular basis.
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Priority Two

Change the role of international staff from regulating the
programme and managing projects to assisting, advising and
mentoring national managers
As the emphasis changes from supporting UNMIS and emergency
mine action to the development of national capacities, UNMAO staff
need to become more actively engaged in developing
interdependencies with their national counterparts. Engagement must
be on a power-neutral basis that recognises the sovereignty of the
national government. Since interdependencies have not evolved
naturally, they will need to be supported by formal organisational
policy and directives. These should include a well promoted policy on
engagement with the national authorities for all those mine action
activities which are not explicitly in support of UNMIS, i.e.
humanitarian tasks, or tasks funded through multilateral sources,
provided for humanitarian mine action in Sudan.

Priority Three

Develop national legislation which allows the national authorities
to regulate and coordinate mine action organisations and
activities
NMAC and SSDC currently draw authority for their work from the CPA
and Presidential Decree 299, although neither document will provide
the two organisations with the mandate to regulate and coordinate
mine action activities post 2011. In particular, the legal status of
SSDC is unclear.
National legislation should be developed as a matter of urgency. It
should clarify inter alia the role and responsibilities of a central
National Mine Action Authority and its two national Mine Action
Coordination Centres (NMAC and SSDC), and the role of the NMAO
as trustee of certain regulatory functions. Legislation should also
address issues such as the implementation of relevant international
treaty obligations, the development and maintenance of national mine
action standards, the accreditation and monitoring of mine action
operators, and the extent of liability for accidents caused by mines and
ERW.
The development of national legislation should draw on the
experience of proven legislation in other mine-affected countries.

Priority Four

UN agencies should understand better the resource constraints
in which the national authorities work, and address the
transparency issues that hamper partnerships
There is a significant imbalance in the funding made available to the
UNMAO and the funding of NMAC and SSDC. This is partly due to
the UNMAO‟s role in supporting the well-funded UNMIS mission, but it
also reflects a deliberate decision to channel most funds through the
UN system rather than through the Government of Sudan. If the
national authorities are to play a meaningful role alongside the
UNMAO, then the UN should place greater emphasis on developing
opportunities for supporting NMAC and SSDC by providing more
resources where possible and where appropriate.
To improve the current situation, the national authorities should be
encouraged to release information on financing; demonstrating how
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nationally-sourced funds are allocated within the national demining
effort will demonstrate sound financial management and will
encourage donors to support nationally-led initiatives. Since finances
are currently a point of contention, UNMAS (via implementing agency
UNOPS) should consider releasing the value of demining contracts on
the UNOPS website, along with other contracts that have values
above $100,00027.
Priority Five

Institutionalise the use the Multi-Year Work-Plan (MYWP) as a
sectoral device for supporting national capacity development;
The MYWP defines the UNMAS-managed mine action portfolio for
Sudan. It enables donors to understand the UN‟s priority for funding in
support of the programme‟s strategic goals, and places capacity
development projects alongside other complementary requirements.
The MYWP includes tools for monitoring progress, and as such is
suitable for charting the development of national capacity and the
progress of transition.

Priority Six

Link mine action capacity development to wider development
strategies and approaches
Capacity development of the national authorities should clearly
demonstrate linkages to other important development programmes
and initiatives such as the UN Development Assistance Framework
and the UNDP Country Plan for Sudan. This is consistent with the
principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and will assist
in demonstrating macro-development outcomes, and progress in
meeting goals such as the Millennium Development Goals.

6.3

Organisational priorities

The following priorities are aimed at improving the ability of the NMAC and SSDC to regulate
and manage mine action in Sudan.
Priority One

Raise the quality management capacity of the national
authorities, so that they can accredit organisations, quality
assure operations, and certify cleared land
Accreditation and quality assurance are two key functions of national
mine action authorities. Both NMAC and SSDC should become
involved in the process of awarding organisational and operational
accreditation to demining organisations who can demonstrate they are
able to conduct technical survey and clearance effectively and safely
in Sudan. NMAC and SSDC should also become involved in
conducting quality assurance of organisations during survey and
clearance, and conducting post-clearance quality control to allow
cleared land to be handed over to local authorities and land
owners/users in accordance with national standards. These regulatory
responsibilities should be transferred from UNMAO to the national
authorities in a timely and controlled fashion, allowing the national
authorities to develop the necessary systems, procedures, knowledge
and skills, and to assume responsibility in a sustainable manner.
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Priority Two

Improve information management capacity within the national
authorities so that they can support mine action operations
through better planning and operational support
Capacity within the national authorities should be developed so that
they can undertake the process of inputting, managing, and
manipulating data provided by organisations conducting clearance in
Sudan. In the South this should be based on the IMSMA system, in
the North where the GIS components of IMSMA is currently restricted
due to US trade embargo on Sudan, training should take place on the
IMSMA system, but alternative mechanisms of manipulating the data
in a spatial manner should be investigated. Responsibilities should be
gradually transferred, for example initially managing data and creating
graphical products in an assisted manner, then unassisted but
monitored, until finally in an unassisted and unmonitored fashion.
[Note: it is understood that FMS - the developers of IMSMA - are
close to getting agreement with US authorities to license IMSMA for
use in northern Sudan.]

Priority Three

Ensure efficient and effective administration and logistics
systems are in place, and ensure transparent and appropriate
financial systems are developed
One of the key problems in Sudan has been the difficulty in providing
timely and effective logistical support to demining operations.
However, logistical support capacity within the national authorities is
currently only rudimentary. There is no claimed ability to manage
fleets of vehicles, store large amounts of equipment, or maintain largescale facilities. If the national authorities are to become a viable
coordination mechanism, effective and efficient logistical support is
required to manage fleets of vehicles, facilities and equipment.
Likewise, the quality of administrative support for activities (including
human resource management) within the national authorities is
variable; in the North, over-reliance on paper-driven systems and in
the South a general lack of capacity. Finally, financial systems are
normative to the overarching bureaucratic framework, so while they
cannot be completely overhauled, they can be streamlined to
demonstrate greater levels of effectiveness, efficiency, and
accountability to the Government of Sudan and potential donors.

6.4

Human resource level priorities

The following priorities are aimed at improving the competencies if managers within NMAC
and SSDC to regulate and manage mine action in Sudan.
Priority One

Ensure that formal training, coaching and mine action exchange
activities are offered only to managers who well benefit from
such opportunities
Senior managers from the national authorities, UNDP and UNMAO
should select only appropriate national staff for formal training and for
other staff development opportunities. Selection criteria should be
used to chose individuals for training, but this should be accompanied
by semi-structured discussions between the senior NMAC and SSDC
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managers responsible for nominating participants, and UNMAO and
UNDP staff responsible for sponsoring the training development.
Priority Two

Develop resource mobilisation and donor liaison skills within the
national authorities
While NMAC and SSDC have made some progress in getting funds
from the Government of Sudan, the national authorities are passive in
their approach to resource mobilisation. To ensure sustainability of
demining efforts in the country post-2011, the NMAC and SSDC
should develop better relationships with the international community in
general and with mine action donors specifically. This will require
individuals involved in raising both internal and external funding to
learn how to interact with stakeholders, market their respective
organisations, present robust business cases for support and
demonstrate accountability and effectiveness through regular
reporting to donors. Consideration should be given to seeking
professional fundraising guidance from organisations such as the
International Trust Fund for Human Security28 who have recently
adopted a programme of international outreach.

Priority Three

Develop needs assessment, project management, and
monitoring and evaluation skills within operationally-focussed
departments
In their capacity as MACCs, the NMAC and SSDC need to be able to
identify the requirement and prepare the specification for mine action
projects including demining tasks conducted by JIDU clearance
teams. The NMAC has developed a basic capability to define and
prioritise requirements, design and manage projects, and provide
effective oversight through monitoring and evaluation, SSDC needs
much more assistance. The development of NMAC and SSDC staff
skills in project management should be a combination of formal
instruction followed by on-the-job coaching and supervision by
qualified international staff.

Priority Four

Recognise individual commitment and support personal initiative
Quality and the commitment of staff varies between and within
organisations. Individuals who demonstrate commitment and are
clearly motivated should be encouraged to develop at an accelerated
speed, and not at the pace of less motivated and less committed staff.
When individuals identify their own training needs in a rational and
well-considered manner, these should be supported by UNDP and
UNMAO. For example, the SSDC finance officer has identified a night
school training opportunity in Juba, that could help to enhance his
accountancy and book-keeping skills, at a cost of US$600. By
ensuring attendance on similar courses, external agencies would
support both the trainee, but also the local institution. This process of
identifying ongoing training opportunities should be formalised, and
embedded within a structured performance appraisal process. The
SSDC should continue to institute its own performance appraisal
process, and preferably with observation and input from a UNDP
technical adviser, with access to a funds for local training. The NMAC
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should consider establishing a similar process, in addition to its
standard civil service performance appraisal systems.
Priority Five

Broaden understanding of the regional context of mine action
UNDP is encouraged to broaden the understanding of the staff of
national authorities to the regional and global context of mine action.
Interaction with staff from neighbouring countries and the wider world
is important to ensure the adoption of best practice through
comparison of alternative management systems, procedure and
practices.

Notes on Section 6:
27.
28.

See, http://www.unops.org/english/whatweneed/Pages/Contractawards.aspx, accessed 20 September
2008.
Formerly the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance.
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SUDAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT STUDY
SECTION 7: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN
7.1

Overview

The capacity development plan includes projects and activities which aim to improve the
enabling environment, organisational capacities, and the competences of individual members
of staff. The plan is designed to address the priorities identified in Section 6 in a timely
manner, and to ensure the development of sustainable national mine action programme.
The plan consists of three phases, each of three years duration. The first phase covers the
remaining period of the UN Mission; the second phase covers the period leading up to the
deadline of the Mine Ban Treaty; the third phase covers the period following the removal of
all known mined areas - when the emphasis will be on delivering mine action services which
support broader national reconstruction and redevelopment goals. For practical reasons, this
plan places more emphasis on the details of the first phase than on subsequent phases.
2009 - 2011

2012 - 2014

2015 - 2017

Phase

Transition

MBT deadline

National development

Lead

United Nations

Government of Sudan

Government of Sudan

Mine action objectives

Clear all high and
medium impacted
communities

Clear all remaining
suspected hazardous
areas

Conduct MRE and VA,
and address the
residual threat as and
when hazards are
discovered

Development objectives

Enable national
authorities to be capable
of regulating and
managing mine action in
all provinces of Sudan

Enable national
authorities to improve
the effectiveness,
efficiency and safety of
mine action in all
provinces of Sudan

Enable national
authorities to regulate
and manage mine
action which supports
broader reconstruction
and development
goals.

The Transition Phase runs from 2009-2011. It is designed to enhance the capacities of the
national authorities and to ensure that they are able to regulate and manage mine action in
all provinces of Sudan by the end of the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan. Interventions
under this phase will contribute to the mine action capacity development goals specified in
both the UN Development Assistance Framework 2009-2012, and the UNDP Country
Planning Document 2009-2011, namely:
UNDAF 2009-2012, 1.2.1
"Strengthen national institutions' capacity to prioritise, coordinate and manage all
aspects of mine action at central and state levels, including implementation of national
and international obligations under the Ottawa Convention (UNMAO, UNDP, UNV)”
CPD 2009-2011, 7.1
"National/sub-national capacities strengthened to manage the national mine action
programme”
It is important to note that during this phase capacity development is aligned with the
transition process, but is not driven by it. That being said, activities must capture the
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opportunities presented by a large UNMAO presence in the country up until 2011, to
maximise the skill and knowledge transfer potential between the various organisations.
The second phase takes place between 2012 and 2014, and represents the “Ottawa” MBT
phase, in which emphasis is placed on meeting Sudan‟s obligations as a State Party to the
Treaty. It will therefore be highly consistent with the UNDAF Goal 1.2.1. There may be new
mine action requirements to be met and new governance issues to be addressed after the
referendum of 2011, but for current planning purposes the “one-country-two-systems”
approach is appropriate. This second phase is followed by a “National Development” phase
where emphasis is placed on meeting a residual threat through a highly mainstreamed
system. In this phase it is assumed that development priorities rather than humanitarian ones
will be the norm.

7.2

Transition Phase (2009 - 2011)

7.2.1

Activities in the enabling environment

Enhancing facilitating factors and removing constraints to performance are the primary
activities in this phase. Without favourable institutional conditions and enabling environment,
capacity development will be stifled. UNDP and UNMAO are strongly encouraged to
undertake the following activities within this phase:
a.

Reinstitute the UN oversight mechanism.
The national Interagency Coordination Group for Mine Action in Sudan should
be established to provide oversight of mine action activities in the country and in
particular the capacity development and transition processes. The oversight
mechanism will act as a top-down driver for change, as well as provide
accountability for achieving results. It can also help to provide the political space
in which change and negotiation can take place.

b.

Regularise meetings of the national oversight mechanism.
The National Mine Action Committee should be convened on a regular basis. It
will maintain and improve interdependencies between northern and southern
programmes as the Committee has representation from both northern and
southern ministers. The oversight mechanism will ensure that implementation of
the mine action policies and strategies are monitored in a regular and
transparent way, and is designed to meet the needs of impacted constituencies
in a balanced and just manner.

c.

Develop relevant national legislation that clearly defines the roles,
responsibilities and powers of the national authorities.
Specifically, this should include legislation, which allows the SSDC to exercise
its authority in accordance with principles of good governance. Proper legislation
will create the framework in which organisations can grow. It will also ensure
accountability and security for the national authorities and the organisations
working in mine action in Sudan (either foreign or national). Lastly it will give the
SSDC the legitimacy it requires in order to begin functioning effectively.

d.

Use the MYWP as a sectoral device for supporting national capacity
development.
The MYWP provides a suitable framework for supporting national mine action
capacity development and offers the prospect of financial sustainability until the
Ottawa MBT deadline. It will align the efforts of all stakeholders and thus
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improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the sector in general, and the
national authorities specifically.
e.

Continue to provide resource support to the national authorities.
Support should be in a manner that is directly linked to clearly defined, strategic
objectives and directives. By resource support, the international community is
removing a clear constraint to implementation.

During this phase, UNDP, UNMAO and the national authorities should work together to
establish a workable system for ensuring knowledge retention and management within the
national authorities. This could either be through the development of better knowledge
management systems, internal (peer-to-peer) training, handover periods, and a career
structure in which individuals are promoted within the organisations, rather than across
different government departments One externally driven incentive system could be the
establishment of a fund for local training, which can be used to train individuals according to
their personally identified training needs, through agencies identified within the local market.
By addressing these institutional concerns, the capacity development plan covers the primary
enabling environment priorities identified during the course of this analysis and assessment.
In order to be realistic and achievable, UNDP should spot opportunities for intervention at the
enabling environment level as they arise, and practitioners should note that given the political
and procedural nature of these activities, there is no specific order for implementation.
7.2.2

Activities at the organisational level

Traditionally, performance at this level can be enhanced through concerted organisational
development. However, in this plan, intervention at the organisational level is proposed
through specific capacity development “projects” that align different agencies with different
mandates with a common vision and approach. This is based on the realisation that for both
NMAC and SSDC, the lack of interdependency during the formative periods of national
agency development has meant that traditional organisational development approaches may
be seen as interfering, rather than assisting. This would be exacerbated if new public
management approaches were employed that sought to limit or reduce the number of staff
within each organisation; particularly in light of the costs and staffing levels currently existing
in the UN programme. The utility of the project approach is also based on the opportunity to
embed capacity development projects within the MYWP. The MYWP is a sectoral initiative,
which demonstrates how the mine action programme as a whole will meet the Ottawa MBT
deadline, and how clearance will be funded and achieved passed the end of the UN mission
mandate in 2011.
The approach offers considerable opportunities for mobilising resources for capacity
development initiatives over a number of years, and will be tracked to the performance of the
programme as a whole. The projects link directly to the Mine Action Strategic Framework and
offer an opportunity for UNDP to harmonise its results-based planning approach – the
Country Planning Document – with the objectives of the programme, and for the UNMAO to
track progress towards transition. Each project is fully equipped with performance indicators
that can be used to track capacity development and progress towards achieving full “national
ownership”. Finally, because the project is managed by the UN, all agencies involved in its
implementation are committed to achieving the project outcomes.
Therefore, it is proposed that a number of projects are developed which cover the main areas
of specific governance (1) quality and monitoring, and (2) information management and
planning. These projects would be supported by a general governance project designed to
raise performance in logistics, administration and finance, i.e. (3) a support systems project.
The projects are based on the assumption that the NMAC and SSDC as organisations will
remain completely responsible for managing their own affairs as organisations. In the
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subsequent phases, once interdependencies have been constructed around the resource,
accountability, and information flows generated through the project, more traditional
organisational approaches and projects can be used.
a.

Quality and Monitoring Project

Strategic goals:

National Strategic Framework Goal: Strengthen the national
mine action institutions to be able to plan and monitor all
aspects of mine action.
Supporting Outcome: NMAC and SSDC plan effectively,
efficiently and conduct quality assurance in accordance with
NTSGs, across all pillars of mine action, and are supported
by robust administration, logistics and finance departments.
UNDAF 2009-2012, 1.2.1 Strengthen national institutions'
capacity to prioritise, coordinate and manage all aspects of
mine action at central and state levels, including
implementation of national and international obligations
under the Ottawa Convention (UNMAO, UNDP, UNV)
CPD 2009-2011, 7.1 National / sub-national capacities
strengthened to manage the national mine action
programme.

Target groups:

Quality assurance director and staff. Operations managers
may be involved depending on circumstance and anticipated
future role. Only individuals from the national authorities
should be involved.
The project targets the quality assurance function within the
national authorities. It addresses the quality management
priorities identified as a capacity development priority at the
organisational level; since it is addressing quality
management, it will develop specific governance capabilities
within the national authorities. Quality assurance staff will
become involved in the process of accrediting and assuring
quality on the current set of organisations conducting
clearance in Sudan. This will be a gradual process that
begins with basic training, secondments and field visits.
Responsibilities should be gradually transferred, for example
initially performing organisational accreditation in an assisted
manner, then unassisted but monitored, until finally in an
unassisted and unmonitored fashion. The project will be
coordinated by UNDP, but the critical partner agency will be
UNMAO where technical expertise currently resides. Other
agencies such as NGOs operating in the country, and which
have good relations with the national agencies can be used to
assist quality managers in gaining technical skills.

Year One activities:

5 November 2008

Translation of the National Technical Standards and
Guidelines from English into Arabic; formal training on quality
and quality management; organisational participation in the
accreditation process; technical advice and work placements;
field visits alongside UNMAO quality management team as
advisors;
purchase of necessary equipment (including
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vehicles); workshops to define quality management policy
and practice within the programme
Year Two activities:

Refresher training on quality approaches; UNMAO provide
assistance in nationally-led accreditation; field visits with
UNMAO quality management team as observers; two
workshops on Quality Assurance policy; continued support for
equipment running costs and maintenance; a training of
trainers course so that quality managers can transfer skills
effectively.

Year Three activities:

Field visits with UNMAO as observers; nationally-led
accreditation with UNMAO as monitors; workshop on quality
policy and practice; supply equipment running costs and
maintenance; a training of trainers course so that quality
managers can transfer skills effectively.

Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex G.
b.

Information Management Project

Strategic goals:

Same as the Quality and Monitoring Project

Target groups:

IMSMA officers from the national authorities‟ headquarters
and regional sub-offices. Planning and staff from operations
and other functional departments with a responsibility for
planning and strategy development. Only individuals from the
national authorities should be involved in the training.
The project targets the IMSMA and planning functionalities
within the national authorities. It addresses the information
management and planning– specific governance concerns –
identified during the course of this assessment. In this project,
IMSMA and planning staff are involved in the process of
overseeing the collection of data, manipulating data in a
spatial manner and extracting products on impact, threat and
mine action activities in accordance with internationally
accepted practice, both for planning purposes and in support
of implementing agencies and other government departments
This will be a gradual process that begins with basic training,
secondments and field visits. Responsibilities should be
gradually transferred, for example formal training to ensure a
base-level competency, then coaching and assistance until in
year three, the national authorities are monitored on their
performance. The project will be coordinated by UNDP, but
the critical partner agency will be UNMAO where technical
expertise currently resides. Other agencies such as the
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining can
be used to assist IMSMA operators in gaining technical skills.

Year One activities:
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Formal training courses on the basics of IMSMA to ensure
that training target groups are familiar with the fundamental
elements of, and purpose of, IMSMA; assisted dataentry/manipulation with UNMAO IMSMA department and
technical officers; technical advice on the use of the IMSMA
database for accessing and retrieving data and making
simple IMSMA products for the operations and planning
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departments; assisted work-plan development using data
extracted from IMSMA with direct assistance of UNMAO
programme management section and planning officers;
equipment procurement and installation (IT, navigation,
vehicles); field visits
Year Two activities:

Formal training courses on intermediate level IMSMA topics;
managing data entry, producing maps and graphical products
at the request of implementing partners and planning and
operations departments, with monitoring from UNMAO
IMSMA operators; ensuring that the quality of the information
in the database is maintained, under the supervision of the
UNMAO; operations and planning departments creating workplans and long-term strategies based on empirically defined
need, under monitoring from UNMAO.

Year Three activities:

Refresher training on IMSMA and any IMSMA updates;
externally-led courses on specific topics, e.g. on spatial
analysis; custodianship of the IMSMA database in partnership
and under monitoring of UNMAO IMSMA operators; strategy
and work-plan development, with assistance and monitoring
from UNMAO as-required.

Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex H.
c.

Support Systems Project

Strategic goals:

Same as the Quality and Monitoring Project

Target groups:

Administration managers and personnel (including human
resource managers), logistics managers, fleet manager,
storekeepers, finance directors and officers. Only individuals
from the national authorities should be involved in the
training.
This project targets the administration, logistics and finance
functions within the national authorities. It specifically
addresses the administration, finance and logistics priorities
for capacity development, identified at the organisational
level. On completion of the project, personnel within these
support departments will be able to support the core business
processes of the national authorities through efficient,
effective and transparent administration, logistics and finance.
The project recognises that national authorities are
embedded within existing or emerging governance
environments, and processes and formalities arising from the
projects will be consistent with overarching government
regulations, for example on financial accounting. The process
of capacity development will be incremental and skills and
knowledge will be gradually transferred, for example formal
training to ensure a base-level competency, then coaching
and assistance, until in year three the national authorities are
monitored on their performance. The project will be
coordinated by UNDP. Other agencies and organisations
which specialise in administration, logistics and finance and
associated management support systems, and which have
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good relations with the national agencies can be used to
assist administration and finance personnel in gaining
technical skills.
Year One activities:

On the job training within administration, logistics and finance
departments; business management software installed; IT
procurement; office supply and partial operational expenses

Year Two activities:

Implementation of coaching system; advanced training
courses (including personnel from Operations, MRE, VA);
training consultancies for specialist knowledge and skill
requirements; IT equipment procured; office supply and
partial operational costs

Year Three activities:

Monitoring of previous coachees; short term training
consultancies targeting logistics, administration and finance
requirements in the MRE, VA, Operations departments; IT
and communications equipment purchased; office supply and
partial operational expenses

Performance indicators to be used in this project are shown at Annex I.
7.2.3

Activities at the human resource level

Activities at the human resource level should capitalise on the availability of large numbers of
international personnel working in the programme. However, to-date there has been a
passive, “open-door” approach towards technical advice and direct mentoring or coaching of
staff from the national authorities. If skills and knowledge transfer is to occur at the levels
required, external agencies must make a cultural shift towards proactive technical advice,
mentoring and coaching of the national authorities. This may be assisted through specific
training on technical advice, skills and knowledge transfer techniques, which is targeted at
UNMAO staff which may work directly with national authority counterparts. Since the specific
governance areas of quality and information management are covered under the project
approach, technical advice will be in a reduced number of areas, and will generally relate to
core competencies.
a.

Develop resource mobilisation and donor liaison skills within the national
authorities
A mentoring system between UNMAO programme officers and UNDP technical
advisors should be established so that financial forecasting, marketing and
donor reporting skills are enhanced. This should also include opening direct
channels of communication between appropriate donors and the national
authorities themselves. However, expectations should be managed; it is unlikely
that any significant budgetary support will be allocated to the national authorities
unless they are well developed and demonstrating significant accountability and
transparency. National authorities should therefore place emphasis on helping
to raise funds for the programme as whole, and identifying and securing funding
sources for indigenous civil society and commercial sector organisations. This
will in-turn build the legitimacy of the national authorities amongst national
stakeholders and civil society organisations, for example.

b.

Develop needs assessment, project management, and monitoring and
evaluation skills within operationally-focussed departments
Specific training courses may be used for this development intervention.
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(1)

Needs assessment training

Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA
departments within the national authorities.
Specific learning objectives of the training:
By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to…
Explain the advantages and disadvantages of a range of research
methods
Demonstrate how needs assessment can be embedded in the project
cycle
Demonstrate an understanding of the need to establish baseline data
Explain the most appropriate methodologies for a given rapid needs
assessment in the mine action sector
Demonstrate an understanding of how needs can be converted into
objectives for action
(2)

Project management training

Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA
departments within the national authorities.
Specific learning objectives of the training:
By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to…
Explain the benefits and limitations of using a project life-cycle approach
Create a work breakdown structure for typical projects in the Sudan mine
action programme
Describe the project planning process and develop project plans
Select an appropriate risk management strategy.
Create a project budget and cash flow appropriate for activities undertaken
by the national authorities
Understand need for effective communications and negotiation, with a
particular emphasis on working with external stakeholders
Articulate the main concepts of leadership, teamwork, and their value to
project management
This training should be synchronised with the organisational performance
projects, so that staff gain a symbiotic understanding between needs
assessments and IMSMA, and likewise between project implementation and
quality assurance.
(3)

Monitoring and evaluation training

Target group: senior and mid-level managers in the Operations, MRE, VA,
departments within the national authorities.
Specific learning objectives of the training:
By the end of the training, the national authority managers should be able to…
Demonstrate an understanding of the differences between monitoring and
evaluation and describe their usage
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Explain the benefits of participation in evaluation and the linkage between
participation, capacity development and accountability
Develop indicators that can reflect performance in terms of quality and
impact
Suggest practical ways of monitoring and evaluating projects that may
arise in Sudan (e.g. emergency projects)
Demonstrate the linkage between accountability, performance
management and quality management
Analyse how policy develops and shapes constituencies, and suggest how
tensions and conflict may arise from macro-level policy, using examples
from VA and MRE in Sudan
c.

Develop a system of work exchanges and placements for employees of
the national authorities
This could include facilitating work exchanges for employees that demonstrate
particular aptitude and commitment to their current roles. Foreign visits and
exchanges may thus be used effectively as part of an incentive system linked to
performance, but it is important that incentives are duly attached to other
capacity development activities and priorities as outlined above. Activities in this
phase can be used to prepare for capacity development interventions in the
Ottawa Deadline Phase by selecting visits that highlight the potential of specific
forms of intervention, e.g. ISO quality management.

7.3

Ottawa Deadline Phase (2011 - 2014)

The Quality Management and IMSMA projects in the Transition Phase address the specific
governance issues of: accreditation, quality assurance and control, information management,
and planning. The Support Systems project addresses a number of key, general governance
issues such the need for probity and accountability within the programme. Through learning
the core processes that define a national mine action authority, personnel within the
authorities will become familiar with mine action in both principle and practice, and thus gain
knowledge of the sector, in a sustained and experiential manner. However, there is space for
further improvement of all organisations. Organisational development may come in a number
of formats – all have the aim of improving organisational efficiency and effectiveness. This
may require changing the structures of organisations, and the manner in which they conduct
their businesses. However, in the state sector, reform is a difficult process and before
transition it is unlikely that the UNMAO has enough leverage to institute reforms within the
national authorities. That being said commitment to change need not be externally driven, it
can be lead internally through the usage of quality management systems that are designed to
lay bare the business processes of an organisation, and justify how they contribute to
stakeholder satisfaction.
It is thus recommended that during the Ottawa Phase, that once the national authorities are
familiar with their roles and responsibilities, a quality management system is introduced within
them. There are a range of commercially available quality management systems that can be
used, but they all have certain elements in common. Firstly, they require a detailed analysis
and understanding of how the organisations deliver products and services, and secondly that
the organisations develop a commitment to continually improving the manner in which those
products and services are delivered and perceived to be delivered. A national authority that
openly demonstrates a commitment to quality through practical application, will be more
resource efficient, transparent, accountable and focused on achieving outcomes. The
organisations are donor friendly and attract sustainable funding.
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7.4

National Development Phase (2015 - 2017)

In response to diminishing need, and reduced levels of resources the programme will have
changed in scale and scope by 2014. It is likely that a raft of new capacity development
priorities will have been identified; and Sudan may or may not have asked for an extension
for its Ottawa Treaty obligations. Experience in other countries and programmes indicate that
at a mature phase, mine action programmes are highly mainstreamed. Tasking and
prioritisation where it occurs, is aligned with the needs of specific development priorities and
private sector work; the NMAC already recognises its future role along these lines. It is likely
that efficiency, effectiveness and value for money are the watchwords of this Phase. It is
strongly encouraged that UNDP conduct a further, detailed capacity assessment in mid or
late 2011 – in addition to its regular reviews – in order to ascertain the priorities and
subsequent way ahead for the National Development Phase.

7.5

Monitoring and evaluation approach

The mine action programme in the Sudan has been characterised by a lack of
interdependency between national and international agencies, and this leads to partisan
positioning around some key issues. In order to avoid bias in the monitoring and evaluation
approach, participation of all primary stakeholders is critical. Firstly, this will ensure
accountability over the results of the evaluation – negotiations and accommodations must be
sought, rather than the executive delivery of judgments. Secondly, participation will promote
learning and capacity development as successes and failures are shared throughout the
programme. In addition to an ethos of participation, the monitoring and evaluation
methodology should incorporate a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative data. Both
types of data are mutually reinforcing – quantitative data provides strong evidence for
processes and outputs, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness, while qualitative data provide an
understanding of the quality of deliverables and outcomes, i.e. efficacy and effectiveness, as
well as information on the manner in which activities are conducted, e.g. probity. To ensure
that the capacity development plan remains appropriate and fit for purpose, it is assumed that
a formative approach to monitoring and evaluation be adopted, i.e. evaluation is ongoing and
the interventions are adjusted to ensure that they consistently meet the requirement.
Evidence for performance at the enabling environment level can be reviewed through
discussion between UNDP, UNMAO and national authorities and other key stakeholders. At
these occasions, success in removing constraints may be informally evaluated, while new
and emerging constraints and opportunities may be identified; intervention at the enabling
environment level may be considered an ongoing exercise. The capacity development
projects, which are designed to address capacity development priorities at the organisational
level, are equipped with their own indicators. For monitoring and evaluating performance at
the human resource level, it is strongly suggested that tailor-made approaches are developed
for each specific intervention. For example, training interventions may be accompanied by
instructor reports on trainee performance and development, formal testing, and line manager
reviews on an enhancement in the skills and knowledge of trainees after they have returned
to work. Work exchanges may be evaluated through interviews with the exchange student,
and the host organisation as to the perceived benefits derived through the process.
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Annex A

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Capacity development

A broad concept which enables individuals, groups,
organisations, institutions and societies to increase their ability
to manage and deliver capabilities – and to take ownership of
the problem and its solution. In mine action in involves the
introduction of appropriate national laws and standards, the
development of systems of governance and coordination, the
ability of national authorities to mobilise resources from national
budgets, and the development of national managers through
education, training and coaching.

Civil society

Civil society is composed of the totality of voluntary, civic and
social organisations and institutions that form the basis of a
functioning society as opposed to the formal structures of the
state. In theory, the mechanisms of civil society should be
distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in
practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and
market are often complex, blurred and negotiated.
[Adam Ferguson 1723-1816, philosopher and historian of the
Scottish Enlightenment.]
In this paper the term is used to describe groups – often NGOs
- such as the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL), the
Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and the Sudanese
Association for Combating Landmines (JASMAR)

End state

The term originates from the military. US Field Manual (FM)
100-5 defines the term as “.... a set of conditions which
determines that the strategic objectives have been met.”
In this paper the term is used to describe a set of conditions
which determines that a mine action programme has achieved
a state in which:

Governance

a)

stable and sustainable national ownership has occurred;

b)

the impact from the remaining landmines and UXO is
deemed to be manageable;

c)

substantial external assistance is no longer needed.

The action or manner of conducting the policy and affairs of a
state, organisation or people [Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition]
In this paper, the term is used to describe the actions or
manner of the national government of conducting the policy and
affairs of the state.
Governance (UNDP definition)
Governance is the system of values, policies and institutions by
which a society manages its economic, political and social
affairs through interactions within and among the state, civil
society and private sector. It is the way a society organises
itself to make and implement decisions - achieving mutual
understanding, agreement and action. It comprises the
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mechanisms and processes for citizens and groups to articulate
their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal
rights and obligations. It is the rules, institutions and practices
that set limits and provide incentives for individuals,
organisations and firms. Governance, including its social,
political and economic dimensions, operates at every level of
human enterprise, be it the household, village, municipality,
nation, region or globe.
IMAS

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) are documents
developed by the UN on behalf of the international community,
which aim to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by
providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some
cases,
by
defining
international
requirements
and
specifications.
IMAS 04.10 notes that:
They provide a frame of reference which encourages, and in
some cases requires, the sponsors and managers of mine
action programmes and projects to achieve and demonstrate
agreed levels of effectiveness and safety.
They provide a common language, and recommend the formats
and rules for handling data which enable the free exchange of
important information; this information exchange benefits other
programmes and projects, and assists the mobilisation,
prioritisation and management of resources.

IMSMA

International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA)

MAC, MACC

Mine action centre (or mine action coordination centre) is an
organisation that carries out mine risk education training,
conducts reconnaissance of mined areas, collection and
centralisation of mine data and coordinates local (mine action)
plans with the activities of external agencies, of (mine action)
NGOs and of local deminers.
[UN Terminology Bulletin No. 349]

Mine action

Activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and
environmental impact of mines and explosive remnants of war
(ERW).
IMAS 04.10 notes that:
Mine action is not just about demining; it is also about people
and societies, and how they are affected by landmine and ERW
contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk
from landmines and ERW to a level where people can live
safely; in which economic, social and health development can
occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW
contamination, and in which the victims’ needs can be
addressed. Mine action comprises five complementary groups
of activities:
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mine risk education (MRE);

b)

humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey,
mapping, marking and clearance;
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NMAA

c)

victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;

d)

stockpile destruction; and

e)

advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.

National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the government
department(s), organisation(s) or institution(s) in each mineaffected country charged with the regulation, management and
coordination of mine action
IMAS 04.10 notes that:
In most cases the national MAC or its equivalent will act as, or
on behalf of, the NMAA; and that in certain situations and at
certain times it may be necessary and appropriate for the UN,
or some other recognised international body, to assume some
or all of the responsibilities, and fulfil some or all the functions,
of a NMAA.

National ownership

In a strict legal sense, the term can be used to describe the
ownership of property by the state, but it is used by
international organisations, NGOs and civil society in a wider
sense as exercising the right and accepting the responsibility to
address issues or challenges of national concern such as
poverty, disease, human rights and global warming.

Objective

Specific targets set by the organisation to achieve its vision. An
objective should be precise and quantifiable, and should be
achievable with the resources which are likely to become
available.

Ownership

In a legal sense, the term is used to describe the exclusive
rights and control over property, which may be an object, land,
real estate, or intellectual property. It is embodied in a right of
ownership, which is often referred to as title. Ownership also
implies some degree of interest in maintaining, or indeed further
developing, the worth of the property.

Sudanmap

The Sudan Mine Action Programme

Transition

The process of changing from one state or condition to another
[Oxford Dictionary, Tenth Edition]
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Annex B
TRANSITION, NATIONAL OWNERSHIP AND CAPACITY
Transition
Despite a dual mandate of service delivery and capacity development, few interdependencies
have been developed between the UN-led mine action effort and the national authorities in
terms of work-sharing, skills transfer or the exchange of information, funds or physical
resources29. The effect that this lack of interdependency has had on the programme are
further-reaching that perhaps originally anticipated; it has led to the development of three
essentially parallel coordination structures and capacities – NMAC, SSDC, UNMAO – which
although sometimes co-located, share little apart from a general vision for a Sudan free of the
threat of landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). The effects of this institutional
disengagement30 led a GICHD evaluation team to warn that national agencies operating
outside of the main thrust of internationally-led mine action activity could lead to: the loss of a
single definitive source of information on the landmine threat; greater difficulty in enforcing
international standards; the potential requirement to re-clear land; and finally the ability to
recognise government capacity31.
Lack of interdependency and differing views on what constitutes acceptable service delivery
have resulted in different standpoints between national authorities and international agencies
on how legitimacy and accountability are constituted within the programme. This issue is
particularly prescient because if the UN-mission is disbanded prior to the attainment of
humanitarian targets, certain roles and responsibilities currently invested in the UN will need
to transition to the government32. In addition to the capacity to coordinate mine action
activities in accordance with normative international standards transition is strongly linked to
issues of governance, accountability and legitimacy, which themselves will have profound
impacts on the development of an effective, practical and sustainable transition plan. Yet
without interdependencies, the danger exists that the UN and specifically the principle
UNMAS component may lack sufficient leverage to bring about organisational reforms to
ongoing national working practices; reforms that the UN feels that are required for a
successful transition process. Unless managed carefully, future activities are likely to be
defined by sanctions rather than incentives, or that the parallel structures will simply continue
to grow in dimension and mandate and thus broadening the potential for conflict

National ownership and capacity
The dominant narrative of transition in Sudan is centred on the concept of ownership. As with
all socially constructed concepts, both terms transition and ownership are contested. This is
certainly the case in Sudan, where multiple agencies, including national executive bodies,
with different values, cultures, missions and mandates seek to fulfil their objectives and in sodoing develop and propagate different worldviews. Many external stakeholders view
transition as the appropriation of specific technical functions by national authorities, as their
own programmatic strength is reduced. Whereas national stakeholders including ministries
and national authorities view transition through a political lens in which certain, sovereign
rights and responsibilities have always remained with the national authorities. It is likely that a
compromise position – if such a position exists – occupies a domain somewhere in-between
these generalised technical and political extremes.
Although the details may be challenged, the basic premise that transition involves the
transfer of power and responsibility in some format is a reasonable assumption. This may be
considered the realm of governance which is concerned with deciding how services are to be
provided, who will provide them, and deciding to which constituencies and for which
purposes they will be provided. The term ownership alone is insufficient to capture the
characteristics of accountability and legitimacy which is the essence of governance, as it is
provided by the UNMAO. For instance, UNMAO cannot necessarily claim “ownership” on the
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behalf of the Sudanese people, thus there is nothing “owned” which can be transferred. The
term trusteeship, which implies a sense of both assumed and sovereign legitimacy in the
delivery of certain services designed to bring about social outcomes can be used to bridge
this ideological gap33.
From this frame of reference, the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GONU) and the
Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) claim ownership over their relevant constituencies in
the North and the South. This is a form of trusteeship based on political legitimacy –
theoretically defined through electoral and policy development processes, taxation systems
and the redistribution of wealth through social services34. Trusteeship in this sense may mean
taking decisions that are developmental rather than humanitarian in nature. The UNMAO
however, has trusteeship vested within it by the international community for the technical
delivery of certain services in support of peacekeeping and general humanitarian purposes.
External agencies such as UNMAO must also prove their legitimacy with respect to their
managers and donors, as well as their beneficiaries and national partners. UNMAO do this
through the efficient and effective delivery of their essential humanitarian and peacekeeping
services35. However, the national authorities may not necessarily feel the need to
demonstrate legitimacy to external stakeholders in the absence of clear incentives and/or
sanctions.
This brief analysis highlights significant differences in accountability flows between internal
and external agencies – they are at the heart of the conflict between development and
humanitarianism. The tangible result is that external humanitarian agencies such as UNMAO
seek assurances of technical efficiency and effectiveness of the National Authorities; they
equate ownership and thus transition with the development of technical capacity from which
responsibility will follow. On the other hand, the government supports the intentions of
capacity development, but naturally defines ownership with the formal legitimacy accorded to
it by the Sudanese people rather than through the international community – uniting concepts
of citizenship, sovereignty and national sentiment. Thus while they recognise the need for
skills and knowledge transfer, they view transition in terms of an existing responsibility from
which capacity can subsequently be derived. The result is a fundamental confusion between
the means of achieving what are essentially the same ends. The implications for both
capacity development and transition are profound.

Capacity and transition
As shown above, there are certain elements of ownership of the programme that can never
be claimed by external stakeholders such as a single UN agency, while the nation-state is
functional, and thus ownership cannot be viewed in terms of technical capacity alone. So
although they are related, capacity and transition are not interchangeable terms. What is
more useful to consider is a process of transition of specific governance functions which are
under the trusteeship of the UN, to national ownership. In this sense, ownership may be
considered the capacity to exercise governance of a mine action programme, i.e. determining
what mine action services are to be delivered, the manner in which services are delivered
and who benefits from the service.
Governance can be divided into two components: (a) specific governance characteristics,
and (b) general governance characteristics. Specific governance characteristics include the
processes by which demining organisations are accredited, funded and tasked. It also
includes the capacity to set priorities and make plans that reflect both humanitarian as well as
national priorities; the capacity to generate funding through a range of mechanisms (national
and international) for mine action tasks; and the capacity to control and ensure the integrity of
information on hazard and impact data.
General governance capacity on the other hand, means providing an environment that
enables the specific governance processes as well as technical management. This includes
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the ability to recruit and select employees based on merit; the ability to ensure that technical
decision making is not heavily influenced by politics; the ability to ensure that decisions are
made in a transparent manner; the ability to ensure that accountability is maintained within
individuals within organisations; and mechanisms to ensure a high level of public access to
decision-makers to ensure that policy reflects the needs of citizens. At a more technical level,
it requires the development of robust management procedures that will allow the efficient and
effective management of processes.
While specific governance tasks will be strongly influenced by the environment in which they
are carried out, the UN is not in a position to transfer these general governance capacities.
They are subject to wider development implications and as such must be built over the long
term. Instead, the UN has assumed trusteeship of the specific governance characteristics
alone36, and these should form the principal basis of discussion on transition. The current
trustees for these functions should be explicit in expressing their conditions for the transfer of
trusteeship, in terms of general governance and functional capacity.
The governance processes are supported by a range of functional capacities. Even though
there is no defined implementation requirement for the national authorities this does not
mean that functional capacity should be subordinated with respect to governance. The
specific outputs of mine action are defined by the five pillars of action, therefore the ability to
be able to accredit, plan, task, monitor and evaluate impact of activities within the five pillars
will be strongly linked to a technical knowledge of these activities. Thus the functional
capacities and governance processes should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Capacity
within the functional areas will include competency in monitoring and coordinating each of the
five mine action activities throughout the project cycle. The cycle should begin at the process
of identifying programme priorities and raising suitable amounts of funds. It should also
include the ability to work with a wide range of stakeholders to build plans of action before
planning, allocating resources, implementing, monitoring and evaluating.

Notes on Annex B:
29.

30.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

Some of these dependencies (such as direct budgetary support from the mission) are not possible, owing to
international defined statutes. For a review of UN-programme responsibilities for capacity development and
transition see UN Inter-Agency Policy (2005) para 62-64; 75; 85
Disengagement is typified by the so-called Wau-Babanosa railroad incident of 2007. For this joint funded
World Bank and Government of National Unity project, the national authorities decided to conduct clearance
without the assistance of the UNMAO, deeming that they could do more, in less time for less money using
military Joint Integrated Demining Units. When the national authorities requested QA support for clearance
certificates, the UNMAO declined on the basis that it cannot conduct quality assurance on unaccredited
organisations such as the JIDU. The national view is that the UN may accredit on behalf of the government
and not accredit the government itself, and subsequently an impasse has developed on the issue, resulting
in two exclusive coordination mechanisms – national and UN. The clearance has been completed but is
unrecognised by the UN. For a detailed account of the incident see Paterson and Bohle, Evaluation of the
UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project, February 2008, pp.19-23
Ibid. p.21
This is in addition to the international imperative to transition, see UN Inter-Agency Policy (2005), para
63-64.
These differences are not purely semantic; they have caused genuine disagreement over the process of
transition.
These are forms of governmental capacity that are specifically supported by the UNDP.
Factors that demonstrate legitimacy to national partners include: adhering to the apolitical UN mandate,
demonstrating respect of cultural norms and values, and perhaps most importantly showing a commitment to
the implementation of the CPA.
Embedded within a general governance environment of its own – the UN governance environment.
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Annex C

UNDP CAPACITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Many capacity assessment tools and approaches are available to development practitioners.
Some are linear and hierarchal while others apply „softer‟ assessment methods, but all share
the same three stage approach which is (1) to understand future requirements, (2) to analyse
the suitability of current capabilities, and (3) by comparing current capabilities with future
requirements, to assess the gap in capacity which needs to be closed through a programme
of development projects.
The UNDP Capacity Development Assessment Methodology has been adopted for this
project. It provides a systematic and defensible method of assessing capacity needs,
establishing priorities and sequencing of capacity development projects and activities. The
approach can be used in complex development situations when it is not always obvious
where best to understand the relative needs and/or the order of implementing capacity
development projects and activities. Not least, it provides a common language to facilitate
discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity assessment. The method thus
represents an appropriate method of determining the capacity development requirements of
the Sudan Mine Action Programme.
This Annex describes the basic principles of the UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology
as outlined in the User‟s Guide37. The adaptation of these principles to the study is explained
in Annex D.

General principles
The methodology is based on a conceptual framework which provides structure to a number
of issues which need to be considered during the assessment exercise. The framework may
be used to develop questions and provide lines of enquiry that are designed to elicit
information on the capacity of an organisation, individuals within the organisation, or a whole
social system. The capacity development framework proposed by UNDP is referred to as the
„default framework‟, and practitioners are encouraged to adapt it to reflect local conditions
and requirements. The default framework represents a complete system of capacity issues
which need to be considered during any assessment; and are described as (1) the points of
entry to the assessment, (2) the core issues, and (3) cross-cutting, functional and technical
capacities.
This can be shown graphically as a three-dimensional block; see Figure C.1. This block is
divided into cells, with each cell corresponding to a coordinate comprised of three variables.
These cells can be used to structure an inquiry into capacity development within a social
system being analysed. By addressing cells in sequence or order, or across different people,
organisations or systems, one can compare and contrast capacity or performance and thus
promote better understanding of the current and required competences of individuals and the
capabilities of organisations.

Points of entry to the assessment
The „points of entry‟ define the scale of investigation of capacity of a social system. The
„individual‟, „organisational‟, or „enabling environment‟ levels mean beginning a structured
investigation of capacity at these levels respectively. It should be explicitly recognised that
capacity at any of the levels will be influenced and impacted by issues occurring at the other
two levels. This is because the enabling environment facilitates or constraints the actions of
organisations, and organisations facilitate or constrain the actions of individuals. Likewise,
the capacity of individuals will affect the performance of the organisation, and the summation
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of organisational performance within a given social system will define the overall vector of
performance of that system – the enabling environment.

Core issues
The Core issues are those issues that UNDP is most commonly called upon to address.
These issues represent a mixture of tangible qualities such as levels of resources or
financing, and intangible qualities such as quality of leadership. The developers of the
framework see that not all of the issues covered by the default framework will necessarily be
totally relevant for the purposes of particular assessment.

Cross-cutting capacities
The cross-cutting functional capacities are those capacities (individual competences,
organisational procedures and practices, and soft issues such as leadership, morale and
common purpose) that are critical for „.... the successful creation and management of
policies, legislations, strategies and programmes‟ (UNDP, 2007, p.5). They correspond to
specific activities within programme and project management cycles, i.e. beginning with
problem identification, generating support for achieving a goal, managing a process, and
finally culminating in monitoring and evaluation of activities. The cross-cutting issues are
supported by a series of technical capacities which relate specifically to the type of capacity
being analysed. These technical capacities include knowledge of the systems and processes
that are specific to the area of capacity development, such as the mechanical clearance of
landmines.
Common technical and
functional capacities

Core and scoping issues
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Figure A1: UNDP Capacity Assessment ‘Default’ Framework
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Comparing current capacities to future needs
Most capacity assessment methodologies have a similar approach and the default UNDP
methodology is no exception. The type of capacity and required level of performance is
analysed, and then the current level of capacity with respect to an agreed end state is then
assessed. It can therefore be seen whether the level of capacity meets the requirement, falls
short of the requirement or even exceeds the requirement. In a rigorously applied, default
UNDP system, this process would be conducted cell-by-cell, and considerable detail on the
levels of capacity may be elucidated for comparison. However, owing to the flexible nature of
this capacity assessment method, cells within the framework may be analysed in a nonsequential manner and this will allow the more critical elements to be considered first, if time
and resource constraints pose restrictions on depth of analysis.
At the end of the process, the results are summarised and analysed. This will allow an
understanding of where capacity gaps and excesses exist. In this way, interventions may be
designed to enhance capacity in areas where it is lacking, and perhaps divert or redistribute
assets away from areas where capacity levels exceed the requirement.

Benefits of UNDP methodology
The User Guide states that the UNDP Capacity Assessment Methodology:
Provides a comprehensive view of the issues that could be addressed in a capacity
assessment;
Brings rigour and a systematic method to determining future capacity needs and
assessing existing capacity assets;
Creates a common language to facilitate discussion among potentially disparate parties;
Provides a structure for discussion about the scale and scope of the capacity
assessment exercise and about expectations of the capacity development effort more
generally;
Provides a method for generating quantitative as well as qualitative data to support the
development of a capacity development action plan;
Makes sense of complex development situations, when it is not always obvious where
best to intervene to promote capacity development;
Improves the consistency, coherence and impact of the work of UNDP; and
Increases the ability to share experiences.

Notes on Annex C:
37.

See: Capacity Assessment Methodology, User‟s Guide, Capacity Development Group, Bureau for
Development Policy, UNDP, May 2007
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Annex D

MODIFIED CAPACITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK
Adaptation of default framework
As a first step in the analysis and assessment process, the default capacity assessment
framework (as described in Annex C) was adapted to suit the objectives of this project, i.e. to
establish the capacities of the national authorities for managing and regulating mine action in
order to develop a capacity development plan that will improve their performance. The UNDP
default framework was therefore adapted so that it was (1) relevant, by ensuring that it is
compatible with the requirements of mine action as a standalone discipline, (2) mindful of the
specific requirements of transition, and (3) inclusive of the core competency areas which
constitute the ability of national authorities to coordinate and supervise mine action
In order to do this, the core Issues were adapted to reflect the core issues of mine action, in
this case the specific governance issues that dominate the discussions on transition and
capacity development in Sudan. These core issues are Accreditation and Quality; Information
Management; Planning, Tasking and Resource Mobilisation. In addition to the default
Functional Capacities – which are essentially skills competencies – a cross-cutting Technical
Capacity (a knowledge competency) was added to the framework. This knowledge
competency refers to the specific knowledge of systems and processes that are particular to
the mine action sector. For example, knowledge of the National Technical Standards and
Guidelines, which would allow a quality assurance officer to conduct his work, this knowledge
is in addition to the project management skills that an officer would require to discharge their
duties effectively and efficiently. These technical capacities were cross-cutting and were
considered where appropriate, as the national authorities would not be undertaking all of the
activities implied by these issues. In order to ensure that against each of these issues, the
capacity to design, gain support for, implement and assess results were covered, the
Functional Capacities were slightly adjusted to ensure that each was relevant and
appropriate for the purposes of the study. The Points of Entry categories remained the same.
For the purposes of this particular assessment it was determined that the assessment
approach would remain more qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, this was because
it would (1) allow the assessment team to explore areas of future performance of the national
authorities which had not been established up until this point, (2) reveal linkages between
performance and facilitating and constraining factors, (3) reflect the problems of working with
agencies that are still formative and frequently changing in scope and mandate, and (4)
represent a more realistic and achievable assessment approach given the operational
constraints, as it contains a greater degree of flexibility.
Owing to the flexible nature of this capacity assessment method, cells within the framework
were then analysed in a non-sequential manner and this allowed the more critical elements to
be considered first. This meant assessing which cells would provide the most appropriate
entry points, and initially placing emphasis at that dimension; focussing specifically on the
performance-related requirements of the national authorities. In practice, the NMAC chose to
enter discussions related to capacity based on Organisational performance, whereas the
SSDC chose to begin discussions at the Human Resource level. From the entry point,
specific linkages to the other levels (enabling environment, organisation, and human
resource) were explored depending on their relevancy measured in terms of their ability to
constrain or facilitate organisational performance.

Sources of information
The information used for making the assessment was drawn from a number of sources. It
included a study of relevant documentation38 and printed materials, as well as interviews with
key informants or high interest stakeholders who strongly influence organisational – and thus
programme – performance. One of the key reference documents is the UNMAO data on
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capacity, which has been collected in support of the transition process. These transition
summary sheets are rich source of information on capacity.
During interviews, a semi-structured interview technique was used. This technique has the
advantage for drawing down on critical issues and investigating causalities; both of which are
important features of an informative and relevant capacity assessment analysis. In addition to
these investigatory methods, a number of roundtable discussions took place with those
national staff assigned with the delivery of the five pillars of mine action. The roundtable
discussion approach was initially used to elicit the nature of the end states39.
In order to maximise the effectiveness of resources in the time available, the assessment at
the organisational level covered the principal national authorities alone and did not extend
into the tactical, implementation sphere. While it is recognised that implementers have a
central role to play, the political importance of the national authorities and their various
abilities to control, coordinate and mobilise resources from government budgets affords them
a critical role. Intervention for aims of national capacity development (and the subsequent
support to transition processes) will therefore be most influential at this level.

Presenting results – the Results Based approach
Following the summary, a number of specific recommendations are provided, which reflect
the capacity development requirements of the programme. These recommendations cover
organisational performance and the facets of the enabling environment that can be improved
to facilitate rather than constrain this organisational performance (i.e. capacity). Recognising
that organisational performance is built on the quality of human resources, the assessment
also presents some recommendations at the human resource level and suggests a number
of proposed interventions which may include training, coaching, mentoring, study visits and
other forms of skills and knowledge transfer.

Technical performance of national authority
Clearance

Mine Risk
Education

Victim
Assistance

Stockpile
Destruction

Advocacy

Accreditation

Quality
Management

Planning and
tasking

Resource
mobilisation

Information
Management

Engage with stakeholders
Conduct needs assessments
Develop policy and strategy
Task, budget and implement
Monitor and evaluate

Governance performance of national authority

Organisational and human resources
Enabling environment
General governance permissiveness

No evidence of performance
Performance (assisted and/or basic competency)
Performance (assisted and/or medium competency)
Performance (assisted and/or advanced competency)
Unassisted, meets requirement

0
1
2
3
4

Notes on Annex D:
38.
39.

Primarily the Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework, June 2006
One limitation of the assessment method is the requirement to hold separate discussions with both northern
and southern authorities. It is assumed that the discussions will remain faithful to the “one country, twosystems” approach. Where possible, the assessment team will identify opportunities for linkage and areas of
cooperation.
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Annex E
VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF CAPACITY - CAPACITY BASELINE
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Governance performance NMAC

Organisational and human resources
Enabling environment
General governance permissiveness

Technical performance SSDC/A

Engage with stakeholders
Conduct needs assessments
Develop policy and strategy
Task, budget and implement
Monitor and evaluate

Governance performance SSDC/A

Organisational and human resources
Enabling environment
General governance permissiveness

No evidence of performance
Performance (assisted and/or basic competency)
Performance (assisted and/or medium competency)
Performance (assisted and/or advanced competency)
Unassisted, meets requirement

0
1
2
3
4

Note: “general governance permissiveness” does not directly equate to performance, instead it represents the extent to which
international “good” governance practices may be observed within the programme, and additionally the ease in which
these practices may be promoted within the specific authority.
Note: where performance of the “enabling environment” is weaker than that of the “organisational and human resources”, this
should be considered specific areas of policy level concern, and may require introspection on the part of external
agencies working with the programme, as to whether or how they are constraining or facilitating performance
Note: the matrices employed above are adapted from a matrix and approach developed by Sekkenes S., and Luff L., 2006.
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Annex F
CAPACITY ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME OF ACTIVITIES
Phase
1.

Activity
Scoping study, confirmation of
requirement, development of
methodology and approach;
institutional level analysis and
assessment

Date
16 June – 25
July 2008

Persons Contacted and Met
NMAC: Awad Al-Basheer; AbdelMonim Jiha; Baballah Brima Baballah,

Target

Methodology

Product

NMAC,
SSDC

Review of normative
policies and strategies
to the programme;
preparatory discussions
with well informed
persons, contact with
senior directing staff
within national
authorities; literature
review of important
documents and
evaluations related to
the programme

Agreed understanding of
requirement, approach
and methodology for the
assessment. Preliminary
institutional level capacity
development
recommendations.

NMAC,
SSDC

Meetings and semistructured interviews
with director, senior
management and
middle management in
the NMAC and SSDC to
analyse future
performance and
assess needs. This
stage included a
performance appraisal
with SSDC staff

Analysis and assessment
of current capacity
measured against
anticipated future
performance

SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter
Doku, Margaret Mathiang
UNDP: Qadeem Tariq; Edward
Meaby; Khalid Abdin.
UNMAO: Jim Pansegrouw; Karin
McLennan

2.

Organisational and humanresource level analysis and
assessment on performance, with
NMAC and SSDC

26 July – 20
August 2008

NMAC: Awad Al-Basheer; AbdelMonim Jiha; Baballah Brima Baballah;
Adel Abdel Hameid; Khalid Ibrahim;
Sylvia Michael; Fath El-Rahman
Gangari; Dr. Ahmed Al-Bedawi; Abdel
Alielah Khalid; Hesham Mohammed;
Mozamil Abo Doum.
SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter
Doku, Margaret Mathiang; Egido
Taban; Philemon Majok; Mike Rashid;
Malek Deng; Manyiok Nul; Lokujo
Pater Jonah; Victor Yuggu; Albino
Deng Juach; Peter Deng; Pater
Mangezire; Aresto Doku; Rebecca
Nyakuoth; Joespeh Lesuk Samuel
;Jurkuch Yaak;

Detailed institutional,
organisational and
human-resource level
capacity development
priorities.

JIDU: Bior Kuir Deng; Basheer Hassan
Ahmed
Ministry of Planning: Kamal Awad
UNDP: Auke Lootsma; Sue Tatten;
Ganiyu Ipaye; Musa Ahmed Ibrahim;
Massimo Diani; Omer Ishag; Qadeem
Tariq; Edward Meaby; Khalid Abdin;
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Pacifico Auguestino
UNMAO: Nigel Forrestal; Joseph
McCartan; Lou Luff; Reiko Kurihara;
Louai Jalal Eldin Mohammed Osman;
Bjorn Vjokovic; Mohammed Kabeer;
Karin McLennan
UNICEF: Insaf Nizam
SCBL: Abdel Aati Abdel Khair Eid.
NPA: Charles Frisby
Cranfield University: Jeff Whitworth
3.

Presentation of early findings,
endorsement of early
recommendations, input into
Transition Policy

24 August
2008

NMAC: Al-Awad Al-Basheer; Jihat
Abdel-Monim; Adel Abdel Hameid
SSDC: Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Peter
Doku, Margaret Mathiang; Mike
Rashid; Simon Yak Deng.

NMAC,
SSDC,
UNMAO, and
UNICEF

UNDP: Sara Sekkenes; Katrine
Kristensen; Qadeem Tariq; Edward
Meaby
UNMAO: Karin McLennan, Nigel
Forrestal; Lou Luff; Reiko Kaurihara;
Severine Flores;
UNICEF: Insaf Nizam

4.

Presentation of final report and
detailed capacity development
plan for the 2009-2012

5 November 2008

November
2008

Cranfield University, UNDP

NMAC,
SSDC,
UNMACO,
wider
development
community
(including
donors and
agencies)

Workshop held in
Khartoum for key
stakeholders on
Transition, with input
from UNDP in
partnership with
Cranfield University.
Input designed to
integrate early capacity
development findings
with the transition
process. Buy-in of
recommendations
sought from senior
directing staff and UN
colleagues

Transition policy that is
compatible with the
capacity development
plan, supported by
UNDP.

After internal review of
sections of the report by
selected UNDP and
Cranfield University
staff; the final report and
capacity development
plan are presented to a
wider audience

Development plan to
raise skills and
competencies for
governance and
management that is
linked to UNDAF, UNDP
Country Planning
Document, and the MultiYear Work Plan

Capacity development
approach (primarily
project based approach
within the Multi-Year
Work Plan) that has been
agreed in principle by all
principle stakeholders to
the programme.
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Annex G
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE QUALITY MANAGEMENT PROJECT
Result
NMAC and SSDC
quality managers
have understood and
are able to work with
the NTSGs.

NMAC and SSDC
quality managers are
able to conduct
accreditation in a
transparent and
formal process in
accordance with
NTSGs.

NMAC and SSDC
quality managers can
manage quality in a
fair and transparent
manner, in strict
adherence to
NTSGs.

Performance
measurement
approaches for mine
action in Sudan have
been established.

SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development
1.

By month 3 (after the project start date), NMAC and SSDC have sent the QM departments of
all national mine action agencies in their region an approved Arabic translation of the
NTSGs.

2.

By month 13, 75% of quality managers of NMAC and SSDC have passed a practical test on
the content of the NTSGs that required them to engage critically with them and respond to
questions and queries, making reference to the original IMAS and the local operational
requirements.

3.

By month 36, 4 quality managers, 2 from NMAC and 2 from SSDC, have managed a
multiple-stakeholder review process for an NTSG.

1.

By month 6 (after the project start date), 90% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have
participated in operational accreditation of a demining organisation that was proposing to
conduct clearance work in the country, with UNMAO.

1.

By month 13, 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have passed a written test on the
entire accreditation process, and have also passed a practical test on the conduct of
accreditation field visits.

2.

By month 25, 50% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have express valid views and
opinions on the accreditation of agencies in review meetings or through their individual
written reports.

3.

By month 36, 75% of mine action agencies surveyed, whether implementing partners or
those proposing to conduct clearance, have reported satisfaction with the effectiveness,
efficiency and integrity of the NMAC and SSDC-led accreditation process.

1.

By month 13 (after the project start date), 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers on
payroll have qualified to EOD level III, and have thus demonstrated practical understanding
of the importance and application of NTSGs in the field.

2.

By month 13, 75% of NMAC and SSDC quality managers have passed a verbal test that
requires them to explain the purpose of quality management and the principal activities
associated with quality assurance and quality control.

3.

By month 25, 75% NMAC and SSDC quality managers have conducted one quality
management visit in partnership with the UNMAO quality assurance team and are able to
express valid opinions on operations (with respect to the NTSGs) and the level of confidence
in cleared land.

4.

By month 36, 75% of mine action implementing partners surveyed express satisfaction with
the competence of NMAC and SSDC-led quality assurance missions.

By month 6 (after the project start date), one trial of mine action performance measurement
guidelines has been completed by NMAC and SSDC quality management units.

Note: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning, to assisted, to
monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in
the field, and not simply based on UNMAO or national authority subject positions.
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Annex H
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT
Result

SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development

NMAC and SSDC
have understood and
worked with the
IMSMA.

1. By month 6 (after the project start date), 50% of NMAC and SSDC IMSMA officers have
received formal training on the basics of IMSMA operation and have been placed by UNMAO
according to their performance during training.
2. By month 25, 90% of NMAC and SSDC IMSMA officers have passed an IMSMA test that
required them to retrieve data and make simple analysis in support of planning and
operations.
3. By month 36, 75% of mine action implementing agencies surveyed have reported satisfaction
with the NMAC and SSDC-led IMSMA product generation process.
4. By month 36, the UNMAO operational management adviser has expressed confidence in the
integrity of the IMSMA database.

NMAC and SSDC
have developed
strategy and workplans in accordance
with empirically
defined need.

1. By month 13 (after the project start date), with the direct assistance of the UNMAO, the
NMAC and SSDC operations and planning departments have created a yearly work-plan that
is consistent with the MYWP, based on empirically defined needs and informed by formal
policies.
2. By month 25, with monitoring by the UNMAO, the NMAC and SSDC operations and planning
departments have developed a longer-term strategy for their region that is based on
empirically defined needs and informed by formal policies.
3. By month 36, 75% of the major mine action donors for Sudan, Sudan government partners
and implementing agencies report that the NMAC and SSDC are able to create effective
yearly work-plans and longer-term strategies in a justifiable and consistent way.

NOTE: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning to assisted to
monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in
the field, and not simply on UNMAO or national authority subject positions.

5 November 2008

Annex H (v2.4)

Annex I
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR THE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROJECT
Result
Providing
administrative,
financial and
logistical support to
the mine action
authorities

SMART indictors of progressive learning and capacity development
1.

By month 13 (after the project start date), 100% of NMAC and SSDC administration, logistics
and finance officers have received formal training on the basics of their core business
processes, and have reported satisfaction with an emerging coaching system.

2.

By month 25, 75% of NMAC and SSDC administration, logistics and finance personnel pass
a test on familiarity with their work requirements and ability to effectively and efficiently
support operations.

3.

By month 36, 75% of NMAC and SSDC donors report satisfaction with NMAC and SSDC in
terms of finance, logistics and administration.

NOTE: For all sets of indicators, the general pattern for UNMAO-national authority activities is: learning to assisted to
monitored. However, all performance indicators should be cross-referenced through reports from agencies implementing in
the field, and not simply on UNMAO or national authority subject positions.
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